melange affected by potential host command execution via license-check YAML mode patch pipeline
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-rf4g-89h5-crcr
PublishedAn attacker who can influence inputs to the patch pipeline could execute arbitrary shell commands on the build host. The patch pipeline in pkg/build/pipelines/patch.yaml embeds input-derived values (series paths, patch filenames, and numeric parameters) into shell scripts without proper quoting or validation, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of their intended context. The vulnerability affects the built-in patch pipeline which can be invoked through melange build and melange license-check operations. An attacker who can control patch-related inputs (e.g., through pull request-driven CI, build-as-a-service, or by influencing melange configurations) can inject shell metacharacters such as backticks, command substitutions $(…), semicolons, pipes, or redirections to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the melange build process. Fix: Fixed in [bd132535](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/commit/bd132535cd9f57d4bd39d9ead0633598941af030) , Released in 0.40.3. Acknowledgements melange thanks Oleh Konko (@1seal) from 1seal for discovering and reporting this issue.
- Source published
- 4 Feb 2026 00:09:15 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:35 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH