MySQL2: Unbounded zlib inflate in compressed MySQL protocol handler allows decompression-bomb DoS

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## Vulnerability Details **File**: `lib/compressed_protocol.js` **Line**: 43 (`zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { ... })` inside `handleCompressedPacket`) ### Root Cause When a connection is created with `compress: true` (and the server advertises `CLIENT_COMPRESS`), every incoming packet is unwrapped by `handleCompressedPacket()` in `lib/compressed_protocol.js`, which calls: ```js zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { ... }); ``` No options object (in particular, no `maxOutputLength`) is passed. Node's zlib convenience methods default `maxOutputLength` to `buffer.kMaxLength`, which on this platform is `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` — i.e. effectively unbounded until the process runs out of memory. The 3-byte "length of payload before compression" field in the compressed-packet header is read (`packet.readInt24()`) but is only used to branch on `!== 0`; it is never used to cap or validate the actual inflate output size, and the real decompressed size is determined purely by the attacker-supplied deflate stream. Because DEFLATE can reach compression ratios over 1000:1 for crafted repetitive input, an attacker who controls (or MITMs, on a non-TLS connection) the MySQL server endpoint can send a single small compressed packet that expands to gigabytes in the client's memory — a classic decompression-bomb / "zip bomb" applied to MySQL's client-compression protocol. ### Attack Scenario 1. Application connects with `mysql2`/`mysql2/promise` using `compress: true` (a documented option for reducing bandwidth, commonly used for cloud/WAN DB connections). 2. The connection target is attacker-controlled or attacker-compromised, or an attacker MITMs a non-TLS connection. 3. Right after authentication succeeds, the malicious endpoint sends one crafted compressed packet whose deflate stream is small on the wire (hundreds of KB) but decompresses to several GB. 4. `zlib.inflate()` starts allocating memory for the full decompressed output with no ceiling. 5. The Node.js process's RSS grows uncontrolled until OOM-kill or crash — no query needs to be issued by the client; the malicious packet alone is enough. ### Impact Denial of Service of the client application (process crash / OOM) — not the database itself. No authentication bypass or data exposure. Requires `compress: true` plus a malicious/compromised server or MITM position. ### Vulnerable Code ```js function handleCompressedPacket(packet) { const connection = this; const deflatedLength = packet.readInt24(); const body = packet.readBuffer(); if (deflatedLength !== 0) { connection.inflateQueue.push((task) => { zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { if (err) { connection._handleNetworkError(err); return; } connection._bumpCompressedSequenceId(packet.numPackets); connection._inflatedPacketsParser.execute(data); task.done(); }); }); } else { ... } } ``` ### Recommended Fix ```js const MAX_INFLATED_PACKET_SIZE = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // e.g. 1 GiB, ideally configurable zlib.inflate(body, { maxOutputLength: MAX_INFLATED_PACKET_SIZE }, (err, data) => { if (err) { connection._handleNetworkError(err); return; } ... }); ``` `maxOutputLength` makes `zlib.inflate` abort with `ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE` as soon as the decompressed size would exceed the cap, routing into the exact same (already-existing) `err` → `connection._handleNetworkError(err)` path, so no new error-handling logic is required. ### Verification Dynamically confirmed on v3.23.0 (HEAD) using a minimal rogue "MySQL server" built on node-mysql2's own server-mode helpers (`mysql.createServer`, `Packets.Handshake`, `connection.writeOk()`). The rogue server completes a real handshake advertising `CLIENT_COMPRESS`, then writes one raw compressed frame (509,604 bytes on the wire — a zlib deflate of 500 MB of zero bytes, ratio 1028.8:1) directly to the socket. A normal `mysql.createConnection({ ..., compress: true })` victim client — which never issues any query — had its RSS grow from 74.3 MB to 1115.0 MB after receiving that single packet, before erroring out with `PROTOCOL_UNEXPECTED_PACKET` once the client tried to parse the inflated zero-filled buffer as MySQL packets. The memory allocation happens unconditionally before any content validation.

Source published

31 Aug 2026 22:36:20 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:51:14 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE