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basic-ftp vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded memory consumption in Client.list()

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-rp42-5vxx-qpwr

Published

### Summary `[email protected]` is vulnerable to denial of service through unbounded memory growth while processing directory listings from a remote FTP server. A malicious or compromised server can send an extremely large or never-ending listing response to `Client.list()`, causing the client process to consume memory until it becomes unstable or crashes. ### Details The issue is in the package's default directory listing flow. `Client.list()` reaches `dist/Client.js`, where the full listing response is downloaded into a `StringWriter` before parsing: File: `dist/Client.js:516-527` ```js async _requestListWithCommand(command) { const buffer = new StringWriter_1.StringWriter(); await (0, transfer_1.downloadTo)(buffer, { ftp: this.ftp, tracker: this._progressTracker, command, remotePath: "", type: "list" }); const text = buffer.getText(this.ftp.encoding); this.ftp.log(text); return this.parseList(text); } ``` The vulnerable sink is `StringWriter`, which grows an in-memory `Buffer` with no limit: File: `dist/StringWriter.js:5-20` ```js class StringWriter extends stream_1.Writable { constructor() { super(...arguments); this.buf = Buffer.alloc(0); } _write(chunk, _, callback) { if (chunk instanceof Buffer) { this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]); callback(null); } else { callback(new Error("StringWriter expects chunks of type 'Buffer'.")); } } getText(encoding) { return this.buf.toString(encoding); } } ``` The critical operation is: ```js this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]); ``` There is no maximum size check, no truncation, and no streaming parser. Because the remote FTP server controls the listing response, it can force the client to keep allocating memory until the process is terminated. How it happens: 1. An application connects to an attacker-controlled or compromised FTP server. 2. The application calls `client.list()`. 3. The server returns an extremely large or unbounded directory listing. 4. `basic-ftp` buffers the full response in `StringWriter`. 5. Memory grows without bound due to repeated `Buffer.concat(...)` calls. ### PoC The following PoC exercises the vulnerable buffering primitive directly: ```js const { StringWriter } = require("basic-ftp/dist/StringWriter.js"); function mb(n) { return Math.round(n / 1024 / 1024) + "MB"; } const writer = new StringWriter(); let wrote = 0; for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) { const chunk = Buffer.alloc(4 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41); writer.write(chunk); wrote += chunk.length; if ((i + 1) % 8 === 0) { const m = process.memoryUsage(); console.log("written", mb(wrote), "rss", mb(m.rss), "heap", mb(m.heapUsed), "buf", mb(m.arrayBuffers)); } } console.log("final text len", writer.getText("utf8").length); ``` Observed output: ```text written 32MB rss 116MB heap 4MB buf 64MB written 64MB rss 296MB heap 4MB buf 240MB written 96MB rss 340MB heap 3MB buf 284MB written 128MB rss 436MB heap 3MB buf 376MB final text len 134217728 ``` This demonstrates sustained memory growth in the same code path used to buffer directory listing data. Supporting files saved alongside this report: - `poc.js` - `poc_output.txt` ### Impact This is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting applications that use `basic-ftp` to list directories from remote FTP servers. - Vulnerability class: Memory exhaustion / Denial of Service - Attack precondition: The victim connects to a malicious or compromised FTP server and performs `Client.list()` - Impacted users: Any application or service using `[email protected]` against untrusted FTP endpoints - Security effect: The attacker can cause excessive memory consumption, process instability, and potential process termination Recommended remediation: 1. Enforce a maximum listing size. 2. Abort transfers that exceed the configured limit. 3. Prefer incremental or streaming parsing over full-response buffering. Example defensive check: ```js if (this.buf.length + chunk.length > MAX_LISTING_BYTES) { callback(new Error("FTP listing exceeds maximum allowed size.")); return; } this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]); ```

Source published
16 Apr 2026 21:37:48 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:51:03 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

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Sources read 30 Oct 04:09 UTC · 272 of 272 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current