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gorilla/csrf CSRF vulnerability due to broken Referer validation

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-rq77-p4h8-4crw

Published

### Summary gorilla/csrf is vulnerable to CSRF via form submission from origins that share a top level domain with the target origin. ### Details gorilla/csrf does not validate the Origin header against an allowlist. Its executes its validation of the Referer header for cross-origin requests only when it believes the request is being served over TLS. It determines this by inspecting the `r.URL.Scheme` value. However, this value is never populated for "server" requests [per the Go spec](https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#Request), and so this check does not run in practice. ``` // URL specifies either the URI being requested (for server // requests) or the URL to access (for client requests). // // For server requests, the URL is parsed from the URI // supplied on the Request-Line as stored in RequestURI. For // most requests, fields other than Path and RawQuery will be // empty. (See [RFC 7230, Section 5.3](https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230.html#section-5.3)) // // For client requests, the URL's Host specifies the server to // connect to, while the Request's Host field optionally // specifies the Host header value to send in the HTTP // request. URL *[url](https://pkg.go.dev/net/url).[URL](https://pkg.go.dev/net/url#URL) ``` ### PoC - create trusted origin `target.example.test` protected with gorilla/csrf and served over TLS hosting form on `/submit` - create attacker origin `attack.example.test` served over TLS - attacker exfiltrates token & cookie combination from `target.example.test` - attacker sets exfiltrated cookie with `domain=.example.test and path=/submit` - as the cookie has a more specific path than `/` (the default for CSRF cookies) it will be sent first by the browser on submit to our target origin - submit form from `attack.example.test` with exfiltrated CSRF form token - observe valid form submission as `attack.example.test` Origin / Referer headers are not validated. ### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker who has gained XSS on a subdomain or top level domain to perform authenticated form submissions against gorilla/csrf protected targets that share the same top level domain. This bug has existed in gorilla/csrf since its initial release in 2015.

Source published
14 Apr 2025 15:26:07 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:24 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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