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ip-address before 10.7.4 allows a denial of service (CPU consumption from quadratic complexity, and application stall) via many % characters in input reaching a function call that uses the Address6 constructor.

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-111997

Published

ip-address before 10.7.4 allows a denial of service (CPU consumption from quadratic complexity, and application stall) via many % characters in input reaching a function call that uses the Address6 constructor.

Source published
18 Oct 2026 00:07:21 UTC
Source modified
18 Oct 2026 11:12:55 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-103378

Published

ip-address before 10.7.4 allows a denial of service (CPU consumption from quadratic complexity, and application stall) via many % characters in input reaching a function call that uses the Address6 constructor.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 18, 2026, 12:07:21 AM

dateUpdated: Oct 18, 2026, 11:12:55 AM

Source published
Oct 18, 2026, 12:07:21 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Oct 18, 2026, 11:12:55 AM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
7 Nov 2026 04:33:26 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-111997

Published

ip-address before 10.7.4 allows a denial of service (CPU consumption from quadratic complexity, and application stall) via many % characters in input reaching a function call that uses the Address6 constructor.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis

Weakness classifications: CWE-1333

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-18T01:16:35.463

lastModified: 2026-10-19T21:13:39.973

Source published
18 Oct 2026 01:16:35 UTC
Source modified
19 Oct 2026 21:13:39 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 05:17:13 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-p3hm-x653-5rc6

Withdrawn

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description ip-address before 10.7.4 allows a denial of service (CPU consumption from quadratic complexity, and application stall) via many % characters in input reaching a function call that uses the Address6 constructor.

Source published
18 Oct 2026 03:32:37 UTC
Source modified
22 Oct 2026 16:30:40 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5

Published

### Summary `new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond. An application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect. ### Details The constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left: ```ts const zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address); if (zone) { this.zone = zone[0]; address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, ''); } const longest = this.groups * 5 + 5; if (address.length > longest) { throw new AddressError(`IPv6 addresses are at most ${longest} characters.`); } ``` `RE_ZONE_STRING` is `/%.*$/`. It has no anchor at its start, `.` does not match a line terminator (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028 or U+2029), and without the `m` flag `$` matches only at the end of the input. For `%` repeated N times and then `\n`, the engine starts a match at the first `%`, `.*` consumes the remaining `%` characters up to the newline, `$` fails there, and backtracking through every shorter `.*` fails too. The engine then starts again at the second `%`, and so on: N starts, each proportional to N. The length limit that follows rejects the string in constant time, after the scan has already run. The line terminator need not be last. Any string in which many `%` characters precede a line terminator behaves the same way. Every entry point that passes a caller's string to the `Address6` constructor is affected: `new Address6()`, `isValid()`, both arguments of `fromAddressAndMask()` and `fromAddressAndWildcardMask()`, and the prefix argument of `fromAddress4Nat64()` and `toAddress4Nat64()`. `fromWildcard()` rejects a `%` before it constructs anything, `fromURL()` admits only hex digits, colons and dots in a host, and `fromArpa()` checks the nibble grammar first, so those three are unaffected. `Address4` has no zone and is unaffected. ### Affected versions `<= 10.7.3`. The zone pattern has been in the constructor since 1.0.0; 5.9.4, 9.0.5 and 10.7.0 show the same timings as 10.7.3. ### Impact `Address6.isValid()` on N `%` characters and a newline, measured on ip-address 10.7.3 and node 24.21.0: | Input | Wall time | Same length of `!` | |---|---|---| | 5,461 characters | 13 ms | 0.1 ms | | 16 KiB | 108 ms | 0.1 ms | | 100 KB | 3.9 s | 0.1 ms | | 256 KiB | 27 s | 0.2 ms | The parse is synchronous, so the event loop is blocked for the whole of the wall time and nothing else on that process is served. No memory is retained and the process resumes when the call returns. ### Reachability The input needs a line terminator after the `%` characters, which decides where it can arrive. An HTTP header value cannot carry a carriage return or a line feed, so a host or address taken from a header does not reach this. A URL can carry both characters percent-encoded at three bytes each, and Node's default 16 KB limit on the request line and headers admits about 5,461 of them: 13 ms. A request body is where the larger sizes come from. Common body parsers default to between 100 KB and 1 MB, and at 100 KB one field passed to the parser unchecked blocks the process for 3.9 s. ### Proof of concept `npm i [email protected]`, then: ```js const { Address6 } = require('ip-address'); function time(input) { const start = process.hrtime.bigint(); Address6.isValid(input); return `${(Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6).toFixed(1)} ms`; } for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 100000]) { console.log(`${n}: ${time(`${'%'.repeat(n)}\n`)}, without the newline ${time('%'.repeat(n))}`); } ``` On affected versions (node 24.21.0): ``` 10000: 41.0 ms, without the newline 0.0 ms 20000: 161.1 ms, without the newline 0.0 ms 40000: 632.4 ms, without the newline 0.1 ms 100000: 3899.8 ms, without the newline 0.1 ms ``` Each doubling of the input multiplies the time by four. ### Remediation Upgrade to the patched release. In the fix, the constructor finds the zone by the index of the first `%` and accepts the remainder as a zone only when it holds no line terminator, which reads the input once. 1 MiB of the input above is rejected in about a millisecond. Every address that parsed before parses to the same result, and a string with a line terminator after a `%` is rejected as it was. `RE_ZONE_STRING` stays exported from `v6/constants` for code that imports it directly and is marked `@deprecated`; the library itself does not call it. If you cannot upgrade immediately, reject a candidate longer than an address with a zone identifier can be before you parse it: ```js if (host.length > 64) throw new Error('not an IP address'); ```

Source published
22 Oct 2026 16:19:39 UTC
Source modified
22 Oct 2026 16:30:30 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 8 Nov 07:24 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current