Malicious code in @torbeck/priority-queue (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-10472
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b3109ebd719fa91812bd69e50b418b78f2a04c5478924f6ff53054cb798dc937) The package republishes @datastructures-js/priority-queue verbatim — identical README pointing to datastructures-js.info, the original author 'Eyas Ranjous', and the upstream repository URL git+https://github.com/datastructures-js/priority-queue.git — under an unrelated @torbeck scope. Its package.json (L33-34) declares "dependencies": { "@datastructures-js/heap": "npm:@torbeck/[email protected]" }, using npm alias syntax to silently substitute the legitimate @datastructures-js/heap with a sibling package @torbeck/[email protected] published by the same untrusted maintainer. src/priorityQueue.js does require('@datastructures-js/heap'), so on every import the substituted @torbeck/heap is loaded in place of the upstream package. The installer-facing harm is the namespace-abuse mechanism itself: any consumer who installs @torbeck/priority-queue automatically pulls @torbeck/heap under a name that reads as the legitimate datastructures-js dependency, regardless of what the @torbeck/heap tarball currently contains. The actual payload, if any, lives in @torbeck/heap and must be analyzed in its own record. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2d7416e9e06b9c46d71f1aa23b1995c28e2c86a2b5c90c02b60380f5d4d15460) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
- Source published
- 13 Jul 2026 19:34:41 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 15:00:56 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.