An issue was discovered in the ckb crate before 0.40.0 for Rust. A get_block_template RPC call may fail in situations where it is supposed to select a Nervos CKB blockchain transaction with a higher fee rate than another transaction.
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2021-45698
PublishedAn issue was discovered in the ckb crate before 0.40.0 for Rust. A get_block_template RPC call may fail in situations where it is supposed to select a Nervos CKB blockchain transaction with a higher fee rate than another transaction.
- Source published
- 26 Dec 2021 21:49:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Aug 2024 04:47:02 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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euvd · EUVD-2022-0528
PublishedAn issue was discovered in the ckb crate before 0.40.0 for Rust. A get_block_template RPC call may fail in situations where it is supposed to select a Nervos CKB blockchain transaction with a higher fee rate than another transaction.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Dec 26, 2021, 9:49:38 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 4, 2024, 4:47:02 AM
- Source published
- Dec 26, 2021, 9:49:38 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 4, 2024, 4:47:02 AM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 9 Nov 2026 23:08:40 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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nvd · CVE-2021-45698
PublishedAn issue was discovered in the ckb crate before 0.40.0 for Rust. A get_block_template RPC call may fail in situations where it is supposed to select a Nervos CKB blockchain transaction with a higher fee rate than another transaction.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: NVD-CWE-noinfo
Original publisher date fields
published: 2021-12-27T00:15:09.580
lastModified: 2026-06-17T04:13:58.220
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:nervos:ckb:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 27 Dec 2021 00:15:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 04:13:58 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 19:17:37 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
osv · GHSA-8gjm-h3xj-mp6w
PublishedAn issue was discovered in the ckb crate before 0.40.0 for Rust. A get_block_template RPC call may fail in situations where it is supposed to select a Nervos CKB blockchain transaction with a higher fee rate than another transaction.
- Source published
- 6 Jan 2022 22:10:43 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Nov 2023 04:07:22 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · CRITICAL
osv · GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm
Published### Impact The RPC `get_block_template` fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC `get_block_template` will fail instead of dropping A. ### Patch First, the `get_block_template` should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions. Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on chain. ### Workaround 1. Submit transaction B when A is already on chain. 2. Let B depend on A explicitly, there are several solutions: * a. Add any output cell on A as a dep cell or input in B. * b. Merge A and B. CKB allows using the same cell as both dep and input in the same transaction. 3. Ensure the fee rate of B is less than A so A always has higher priority.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2021 21:01:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Nov 2023 04:07:22 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · RUSTSEC-2021-0107
Published## Impact The RPC get_block_template fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC get_block_template will fail instead of dropping A. ## Patch First, the get_block_template should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions. Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on chain. ## Workaround Submit transaction B when A is already on chain. Let B depend on A explicitly, there are several solutions: a. Add any output cell on A as a dep cell or input in B. b. Merge A and B. CKB allows using the same cell as both dep and input in the same transaction. Ensure the fee rate of B is less than A so A always has higher priority.
- Source published
- 25 Jul 2021 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Oct 2026 18:00:03 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.