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New API: Unauthenticated payment webhooks allow memory and disk DoS via unbounded body reads and full-body logging

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-v828-m3pf-vq9q

Published

## Summary Unauthenticated payment webhook endpoints could read and log the entire request body before validating the webhook signature. When a payment webhook was enabled, an unauthenticated attacker could send oversized requests to public callback endpoints and force excessive memory use and log growth before the request was rejected. Affected public endpoints included: - `POST /api/stripe/webhook` - `POST /api/creem/webhook` - `POST /api/waffo/webhook` This issue did not allow forging successful payments, because signature validation still guarded the payment processing logic. The vulnerable behavior was the expensive unauthenticated request processing that occurred before signature validation. ## Impact A remote unauthenticated attacker could cause denial of service through memory pressure, container OOM/restarts, or disk consumption from full-body logging. The impact is availability-only and is rated High. ## Affected versions Versions before `v1.0.0-rc.11` are affected. The earlier affected range of `<= v1.0.0-rc.7` was incomplete; the anonymous request body limit was introduced later and first appears in `v1.0.0-rc.11`. ## Patches This issue is fixed in `v1.0.0-rc.11`. The fix adds `middleware.AnonymousRequestBodyLimit()` and applies it to unauthenticated POST routes, including the payment webhook callbacks. The default limit is controlled by `ANONYMOUS_REQUEST_BODY_LIMIT_KB` and defaults to 512 KiB. ## Workarounds If upgrading immediately is not possible, operators should disable unused payment webhooks, enforce request body limits at a reverse proxy or load balancer, and ensure application and container logs have rotation and quotas. These mitigations reduce exposure but do not replace upgrading. ## References - Fixed by commit `d2f7f9ee3adf3ef66798783a60d7bc712451c85c`. - Relevant code paths: `router/api-router.go`, `middleware/request_body_limit.go`, `controller/topup_stripe.go`, `controller/topup_creem.go`, and `controller/topup_waffo.go`.

Source published
17 Aug 2026 16:35:58 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:10:43 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

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