rkyv: Panic safety bugs in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear` enable arbitrary code execution
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-vfvv-c25p-m7mm
Published`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element's `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value. A subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements: - `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`'s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped. - `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the user closure returns. ## Technical Impact - **CWE-415 (Double Free):** Heap corruption when element type holds `Box<T>` - **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** Memory corruption when element reads from heap during `Drop` Both vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via `std::panic::catch_unwind` and require no special privileges.
- Source published
- 15 May 2026 18:09:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:47 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE