Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Some sources, documents or advisories need attention: 275/275 feeds/APIs · 469/469 docs · 8/9 advisories · checked 23:10 UTC Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

@conventional-changelog/git-client has Argument Injection vulnerability

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-vh25-5764-9wcr

Published

## Background on exploitation This vulnerability manifests with the library's `getTags()` API, which allows specifying extra parameters passed to the `git log` command. In another API by this library - `getRawCommits()` there are secure practices taken to ensure that the extra parameter `path` is unable to inject an argument by ending the `git log` command with the special shell syntax `--`. However, the library does not follow the same practice for `getTags()` not attempts to sanitize for user input, validate the given params, or restrcit them to an allow list. Nor does it properly pass command-line flags to the `git` binary using the double-dash POSIX characters (`--`) to communicate the end of options. Thus, allowing users to exploit an argument injection vulnerability in Git due to the `--output=` command-line option that results with overwriting arbitrary files. ## Exploit 1. Install `@conventional-changelog/[email protected]` or earlier 2. Prepare a Git directory to be used as source 3. Create the following script for the proof-of-concept: ```js import { GitClient, } from "@conventional-changelog/git-client"; async function main() { const gitDirectory = "/tmp/some-git-directory"; const client = new GitClient(gitDirectory); const params = ["--output=/tmp/r2d2"]; for await (const tag of client.getTags(params)) { console.log(tag); } } main(); ``` 3. Observe new file created on disk at `/tmp/r2d2` ## Impact While the scope is only limited to writing a file with input from the git log result, it still allows to specify and overwrite any arbitrary files on disk, such as `.env` or as far as critical system configuration at `/etc` if the application is running as privileged `root` user. It may be the library's design choice to expose a generic `params` object to allow any consuming users to specify random Git command line arguments, however it could be abused by attackers when developers aren't aware of the security risks which aren't communicated. As such, I recommend not ignoring, and either patching this insecure design gap with hardened secure coding practices (like in other APIs mentioned previously) or adding a security disclaimer to this library's documentation. # Author / Credit Liran Tal

Source published
22 Sep 2025 18:01:01 UTC
Source modified
22 Sep 2025 21:59:10 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 8 Nov 23:10 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current