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CoreDNS TSIG authentication bypass on gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 transports

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-35579

Published

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. In versions prior to 1.14.3, the gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 transport implementations incorrectly handle TSIG authentication. For gRPC and QUIC, the server checks whether the TSIG key name exists in the configuration but never calls dns.TsigVerify() to validate the HMAC. If the key name matches a configured key, the tsigStatus field remains nil and the tsig plugin treats the request as successfully authenticated regardless of the MAC value. For DoH and DoH3, the issue is more severe: the DoHWriter.TsigStatus() method unconditionally returns nil, and the server never inspects the TSIG record at all. Any request containing a TSIG record is treated as authenticated over DoH and DoH3, even if the key name is invalid and the MAC is arbitrary. An unauthenticated network attacker can exploit this to bypass TSIG-protected functionality such as AXFR/IXFR zone transfers, dynamic DNS updates, or other TSIG-gated plugin behavior. The DoH and DoH3 variants have a lower exploitation bar because the attacker does not need to know a valid TSIG key name. This issue has been fixed in version 1.14.3. As a workaround, disable gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 listeners where TSIG authentication is required, or restrict network-level access to affected transport ports to trusted sources only.

Source published
5 May 2026 20:29:16 UTC
Source modified
15 Jul 2026 01:02:40 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-27493

Published

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. In versions prior to 1.14.3, the gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 transport implementations incorrectly handle TSIG authentication. For gRPC and QUIC, the server checks whether the TSIG key name exists in the configuration but never calls dns.TsigVerify() to validate the HMAC. If the key name matches a configured key, the tsigStatus field remains nil and the tsig plugin treats the request as successfully authenticated regardless of the MAC value. For DoH and DoH3, the issue is more severe: the DoHWriter.TsigStatus() method unconditionally returns nil, and the server never inspects the TSIG record at all. Any request containing a TSIG record is treated as authenticated over DoH and DoH3, even if the key name is invalid and the MAC is arbitrary. An unauthenticated network attacker can exploit this to bypass TSIG-protected functionality such as AXFR/IXFR zone transfers, dynamic DNS updates, or other TSIG-gated plugin behavior. The DoH and DoH3 variants have a lower exploitation bar because the attacker does not need to know a valid TSIG key name. This issue has been fixed in version 1.14.3. As a workaround, disable gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 listeners where TSIG authentication is required, or restrict network-level access to affected transport ports to trusted sources only.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 5, 2026, 8:29:16 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 1:02:40 AM

4 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-1283: CoreDNS: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen

CVE-2026-33190 · CVE-2026-33489 · CVE-2026-35579 · CVE-2026-32934 · CVE-2026-32936

RHSA-2026:25127: Red Hat Security Advisory: Submariner v0.21 security fixes and container updates

CVE-2024-25621 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-61728 · CVE-2025-61729 · CVE-2025-68121 · CVE-2025-68151 · CVE-2026-21441 · CVE-2026-25679 · CVE-2026-26017 · CVE-2026-26018 · CVE-2026-32280 · CVE-2026-32936 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-35579

msrc_CVE-2026-35579: CoreDNS TSIG authentication bypass on gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 transports

CVE-2026-35579

openSUSE-SU-2026:20703-1: Security update for coredns

CVE-2026-27140 · CVE-2026-27143 · CVE-2026-27144 · CVE-2026-32282 · CVE-2026-32283 · CVE-2026-32288 · CVE-2026-32289 · CVE-2026-32934 · CVE-2026-32936 · CVE-2026-33190 · CVE-2026-33489 · CVE-2026-33810 · CVE-2026-35579

Source published
May 5, 2026, 8:29:16 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 15, 2026, 1:02:40 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 13:07:49 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-35579

Published

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. In versions prior to 1.14.3, the gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 transport implementations incorrectly handle TSIG authentication. For gRPC and QUIC, the server checks whether the TSIG key name exists in the configuration but never calls dns.TsigVerify() to validate the HMAC. If the key name matches a configured key, the tsigStatus field remains nil and the tsig plugin treats the request as successfully authenticated regardless of the MAC value. For DoH and DoH3, the issue is more severe: the DoHWriter.TsigStatus() method unconditionally returns nil, and the server never inspects the TSIG record at all. Any request containing a TSIG record is treated as authenticated over DoH and DoH3, even if the key name is invalid and the MAC is arbitrary. An unauthenticated network attacker can exploit this to bypass TSIG-protected functionality such as AXFR/IXFR zone transfers, dynamic DNS updates, or other TSIG-gated plugin behavior. The DoH and DoH3 variants have a lower exploitation bar because the attacker does not need to know a valid TSIG key name. This issue has been fixed in version 1.14.3. As a workaround, disable gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 listeners where TSIG authentication is required, or restrict network-level access to affected transport ports to trusted sources only.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-287 · CWE-303

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-05-05T21:16:22.247

lastModified: 2026-07-24T21:10:00.143

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:coredns.io:coredns:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
5 May 2026 21:16:22 UTC
Source modified
24 Jul 2026 21:10:00 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 08:17:41 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-vp29-5652-4fw9

Published

### Summary The gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 transports in CoreDNS incorrectly handle TSIG authentication. For gRPC and QUIC, CoreDNS checks whether the TSIG key name exists in the config, but does not actually verify the TSIG HMAC. If the key name matches, `tsigStatus` remains nil and the tsig plugin treats the request as "verified". For DoH and DoH3, the issue is worse: TSIG is not verified at all. The DoH response writer has `TsigStatus()` hardcoded to return nil, so any request containing a TSIG record is treated as authenticated, even if the key name is invalid and the MAC is garbage. As a result, attackers may bypass TSIG authentication on affected transports and access TSIG-protected functionality such as AXFR/IXFR zone transfers, dynamic updates, or other TSIG-gated plugin behavior. ### Details In `server_grpc.go` and `server_quic.go`, the TSIG handling checks whether the TSIG key name exists, but does not call `dns.TsigVerify()`. Relevant code before fix: ```go if tsig := msg.IsTsig(); tsig != nil { if s.tsigSecret == nil { w.tsigStatus = dns.ErrSecret } else if _, ok := s.tsigSecret[tsig.Hdr.Name]; !ok { w.tsigStatus = dns.ErrSecret } // key found -> nothing happens -> tsigStatus stays nil -> "verified" } ``` This means that for gRPC and QUIC, a request with a known TSIG key name but an invalid MAC is accepted as authenticated. PRs #7943 and #7947 partially addressed this area by adding key name checks for gRPC and QUIC, but did not add HMAC verification. The DoH and DoH3 paths have an even weaker failure mode. In `https.go`, `DoHWriter.TsigStatus()` returned nil unconditionally: ```go func (d *DoHWriter) TsigStatus() error { return nil } ``` In `server_https.go`, the incoming DNS message is unpacked from the HTTP request and passed directly into `ServeDNS()` without checking `msg.IsTsig()`, without looking up the TSIG key name, and without calling `dns.TsigVerify()`. The same pattern exists in the DoH3 path in `server_https3.go`. The effective DoH/DoH3 flow before the fix was: 1. HTTP or HTTP/3 request arrives. 2. DNS message is unpacked from the request. 3. A `DoHWriter` is created. 4. The message is passed to `ServeDNS()`. 5. The tsig plugin checks `w.TsigStatus()`. 6. `TsigStatus()` returns nil. 7. nil is interpreted as successful TSIG verification. This means that for DoH and DoH3, CoreDNS did not even require a valid TSIG key name. Any TSIG record was enough to satisfy the tsig plugin, regardless of key name or MAC contents. ### PoC Setup: built CoreDNS from master at commit `12d9457` and also verified against the v1.14.2 release binary. Configured a single test zone with 9 records and `tsig { require all }`. Listeners used the same TSIG configuration and key: - TCP on port 1053, using the normal `dns.Server` path where TSIG HMAC verification works correctly - gRPC on port 1443, using manual TSIG handling - DoH on port 8443 - DoH3 with the same TSIG configuration #### gRPC / QUIC behavior A test client sent AXFR requests over gRPC with a valid TSIG key name but forged MAC values. The same requests were sent over TCP for comparison. | MAC used | gRPC | TCP | |----------|------|-----| | 32 zero bytes | BYPASS, 9 records returned | BADSIG | | 32 random bytes | BYPASS, 9 records returned | BADSIG | | HMAC computed with wrong secret | BYPASS, 9 records returned | BADSIG | | truncated to 16 bytes | BYPASS, 9 records returned | BADSIG | | single byte `0x41` | BYPASS, 9 records returned | BADSIG | | empty MAC | BYPASS, 9 records returned | BADSIG | | wrong key name + zero MAC | REJECTED, NOTAUTH/BADKEY | REJECTED, NOTAUTH/BADKEY | 6 out of 7 forged TSIG requests bypassed authentication over gRPC and returned a full zone transfer. The only rejected case was the wrong key name, because the gRPC path checked whether the key name existed. The same class applied to QUIC. #### DoH / DoH3 behavior For DoH, a test client sent DNS queries over HTTPS POST to `/dns-query` with forged TSIG records. These requests were also compared against TCP. | TSIG variant | DoH result | TCP result | |-------------|------------|------------| | 32 zero bytes | BYPASS, NOERROR | BADSIG | | 32 random bytes | BYPASS, NOERROR | BADSIG | | HMAC computed with wrong secret | BYPASS, NOERROR | BADSIG | | truncated to 16 bytes | BYPASS, NOERROR | BADSIG | | single byte `0x41` | BYPASS, NOERROR | BADSIG | | empty MAC | BYPASS, NOERROR | BADSIG | | bad key name | BYPASS, NOERROR | NOTAUTH/BADKEY | | no TSIG record | REJECTED, REFUSED | REJECTED, REFUSED | 7 out of 8 cases bypassed authentication over DoH. Every request containing a TSIG record was accepted, including requests with an invalid key name. An AXFR request over DoH with a forged TSIG record using a zero-byte MAC returned the full test zone. The same pattern applies to DoH3 because it used the same `DoHWriter` TSIG behavior and did not verify TSIG before passing the message into the plugin chain. To confirm that the tsig plugin itself was enforcing policy, requests with no TSIG record were rejected with `REFUSED`. The bypass happens because the transport layer reports successful TSIG verification when verification either did not happen or only checked the key name. ### Impact An unauthenticated network attacker may bypass TSIG authentication on affected CoreDNS transports. Depending on configuration, this may allow an attacker to: - perform AXFR or IXFR zone transfers over affected transports - dump TSIG-protected zone data - submit dynamic DNS updates if enabled - bypass other TSIG-gated plugin behavior - authenticate over DoH or DoH3 without knowing a valid TSIG key name The DoH and DoH3 variants have a lower exploitation bar than gRPC and QUIC because the attacker does not need to know a configured TSIG key name. Any TSIG record is treated as valid. ### Affected transports - gRPC - QUIC - DoH - DoH3 ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: - Disable gRPC, QUIC, DoH, and DoH3 listeners where TSIG authentication is required. - Restrict network-level access to affected transport ports to trusted sources only. - Avoid exposing TSIG-protected functionality such as AXFR, IXFR, or dynamic updates over affected transports. ### Fix Affected transports must verify TSIG before passing the DNS message into the plugin chain. For requests containing a TSIG record, the transport should: 1. check whether TSIG secrets are configured 2. verify that the TSIG key name exists 3. call `dns.TsigVerify()` against the original wire-format message 4. store the resulting status in the response writer 5. return that status from `TsigStatus()` A successful key name lookup alone is not sufficient. A nil TSIG status must only be returned after successful HMAC verification.

Source published
28 Apr 2026 22:54:32 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:51:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5667

Published

CoreDNS has TSIG authentication bypass on gRPC and QUIC transports in github.com/coredns/coredns

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:38 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 23:01:27 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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