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Malicious code in node-pino (npm)

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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osv · MAL-2026-6762

Published

node-pino is a one-edit typosquat of the popular `pino` logger that ships repackaged `winston` plus a malicious `postinstall` dropper. On `npm install`, the postinstall hook (`npm run license` -> `node lib/winston/license`) spawns a DETACHED, unref'd child process that reads an AES-256-CBC-encrypted blob (`license.list`, ~211 KB), decrypts it with a hardcoded key/iv, and `eval()`s the ~105 KB obfuscated infostealer payload. The stealer targets crypto wallets (exodus.wallet), the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data, zips the loot to `p5.zip`, and exfiltrates via HTTP POST /upload to a hardcoded C2 (port :1224). Structure, the :1224 C2 port, and targeting are CONSISTENT WITH the DPRK 'Contagious Interview' / BeaverTail npm campaign (stated as consistent-with, not a definitive actor attribution). First published 2025-09-16 (single version), it remained live and installable for ~278 days on no advisory list until pkgproof flagged it via semantic name<->content coherence analysis. Indicators of compromise: postinstall -> `npm run license` -> `node lib/winston/license`; detached, unref'd child that outlives `npm install`; AES-256-CBC-encrypted `license.list` (~211 KB) with a hardcoded key/iv in `parse.js`; `eval()` of the ~105 KB decrypted obfuscated payload; C2 on port :1224; exfiltration via zip to `p5.zip` and HTTP POST /upload; targets exodus.wallet, the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data. All IOCs were extracted by STATIC/OFFLINE analysis (offline decryption of the bundled blob); the attacker payload was never executed, so no live C2 callback or runtime artifact was generated by this analysis. The decryption key, the deobfuscated payload, and the exact C2 host are deliberately omitted; no specific IP is asserted. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (c931f155b77679c54a55fcfcab733826373baaf86922de6fed9adeb9dd6b0705) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published
1 Jul 2026 00:00:00 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 06:30:11 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 20 Nov 22:12 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current