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Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w

Published

### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network. ### Summary The finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer. Because the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch. ### Details The finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid. The code panics on the intermediate overflow via `.expect()` on the balance addition. Under Zebra's `panic = "abort"` release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic. An attacker with approximately 1,100–2,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only. ### Patches Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd's approach. ### Workarounds No workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2. ### Impact A single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt. ### Credit Reported by `@sangsoo-osec`.

Source published
2 Jul 2026 19:44:54 UTC
Source modified
2 Jul 2026 20:11:30 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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