n8n: Authenticated Users Can Exhaust Temporary Disk Storage via Data-Table File Uploads

## Impact An authenticated user can repeatedly upload files to the data-table upload endpoint, bypassing the per-request quota check, which does not account for files already written to the shared temporary directory. This causes temporary files to accumulate on disk until the periodic cleanup runs, potentially exhausting available disk space on the host. ## Patches Users should upgrade to the patched version once available to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. - Set `uploadMaxFileSize` to a low value to limit individual upload size. - Monitor and alert on disk usage in the n8n temporary upload directory. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Source published

22 Jul 2026 22:25:45 UTC

Source modified

22 Jul 2026 22:31:06 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE