Quasar Framework: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Write via crafted Icon Genie profile

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/icongenie 6.1.1, the icongenie generate --profile command accepted folder and name values from a user-supplied profile without constraining the resolved destination to the Quasar project directory. icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js joined those values with appDir, while icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js required only non-empty strings, allowing parent-directory traversal. A developer who runs a crafted profile can cause generated image content to be written or overwritten at any path writable by that user, potentially modifying shell startup files, build scripts, or other executable configuration. This issue is fixed in version 6.1.1.

Source published

6 Oct 2026 17:11:03 UTC

Source modified

6 Oct 2026 19:42:52 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/icongenie 6.1.1, the icongenie generate --profile command accepted folder and name values from a user-supplied profile without constraining the resolved destination to the Quasar project directory. icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js joined those values with appDir, while icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js required only non-empty strings, allowing parent-directory traversal. A developer who runs a crafted profile can cause generated image content to be written or overwritten at any path writable by that user, potentially modifying shell startup files, build scripts, or other executable configuration. This issue is fixed in version 6.1.1.

Source published

Oct 6, 2026, 5:11:03 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 6, 2026, 7:42:52 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 05:31:55 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/icongenie 6.1.1, the icongenie generate --profile command accepted folder and name values from a user-supplied profile without constraining the resolved destination to the Quasar project directory. icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js joined those values with appDir, while icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js required only non-empty strings, allowing parent-directory traversal. A developer who runs a crafted profile can cause generated image content to be written or overwritten at any path writable by that user, potentially modifying shell startup files, build scripts, or other executable configuration. This issue is fixed in version 6.1.1.

Source published

6 Oct 2026 18:16:51 UTC

Source modified

6 Oct 2026 20:17:17 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 04:17:41 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

## Vulnerability Details **File**: `icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js` (line 35, `absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`) **Validation gap**: `icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js` (`assetsSchema`) — `folder`/`name` only checked with `Joi.string().required().min(1)`, no restriction on `..` sequences or absolute paths **Entry point**: `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js` (`generate(argv)`) — `profile.assets = userProfile.assets`, loaded verbatim from a user-supplied JSON file via `--profile <file>` ### Root Cause `icongenie generate --profile <file>` loads a JSON "profile" describing icon/splashscreen assets to generate, where each asset entry has a `folder`/`name` describing where the generated file should be written relative to the Quasar project directory (`appDir`). `getAssetsFiles()` builds the write target with `join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`. Node's `path.join` normalizes `..` segments arithmetically and does not clamp the result to stay inside `appDir`. The only validation before this (`validateProfileObject` → Joi `assetsSchema`) checks that `folder`/`name` are non-empty strings, with no `..` rejection and no containment check against `appDir`. A profile setting `folder: "../../../../../../tmp/pwned-by-icongenie"` sails through validation unmodified, and the generator writes attacker-influenced icon/splashscreen content to that path via a direct `writeFile`/`sharp().toFile()` call. ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker publishes a "ready-made Icon Genie profile" (gist, starter-kit repo, support forum attachment) that looks like a normal icon-generation config but includes an asset entry with a traversal `folder`. 2. A developer working on a Quasar project runs `icongenie generate --profile malicious-profile.json` (a normal, documented workflow) inside their project. 3. `getAssetsFiles()` resolves the write target outside the project directory; the generator writes attacker-controlled content to that path — e.g. planting/overwriting shell startup files, cron entries, or CI/build scripts. ### Impact - **Type**: CWE-22 Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Write - **Auth required**: No network auth — local CLI trust; requires the developer to run icongenie against a profile they didn't fully author/audit themselves - **Consequence**: Arbitrary file write/overwrite at any path the running user can write to, scoped by the number of `..` segments — can lead to persistence (cron/shell rc file) or supply-chain-style code execution if the written file is later executed/sourced. ### Vulnerable Code (`icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js`) ```js export function getAssetsFiles(assets) { ... return list.map(({ tag, ...asset }) => { const file = { ...asset, relativeName: join(asset.folder, asset.name), absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name) // no containment check } ... }) } ``` ### Recommended Fix ```js import { resolve, sep } from 'node:path' const absoluteName = resolve(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name) if (absoluteName !== appDir && !absoluteName.startsWith(appDir + sep)) { fatal(`Profile asset escapes the project folder: "${asset.folder}/${asset.name}"`) } ``` ### Verification Confirmed end-to-end on v2.21.1 by running the real, unmodified `icongenie generate()` function (from `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js`) against a scratch Quasar project containing a crafted `malicious-profile.json` with `"folder": "../../outside-target-marker"`. icongenie's own console output self-reported the traversal (`Generated svg: ../../outside-target-marker/pwned-outside-project.svg`), and the generated SVG file was independently verified on disk two directory levels outside the project folder. A fix branch (`fix/icongenie-path-traversal-asset-folder`) is ready with the minimal patch above. Re-running the same malicious profile against the patched code now aborts immediately with `Profile asset escapes the project folder: "../../outside-target-marker/pwned-outside-project.svg"` and writes nothing outside the project, while a legitimate profile (`folder: "public/icons"`) continues to work exactly as before.

Source published

7 Oct 2026 16:14:14 UTC

Source modified

7 Oct 2026 16:30:04 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH