Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Gemini CLI CI/CD Workflows
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-12537
PublishedImproper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.
- Source published
- 24 Jun 2026 13:37:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Jun 2026 13:53:24 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 10.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/U:Clear
euvd · EUVD-2026-38790
PublishedImproper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 24, 2026, 1:37:21 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 24, 2026, 1:53:24 PM
- Source published
- Jun 24, 2026, 1:37:21 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jun 24, 2026, 1:53:24 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 11 Nov 2026 06:26:26 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 10.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/U:Clear
nvd · CVE-2026-12537
PublishedImproper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-78
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-24T14:17:29.630
lastModified: 2026-07-02T19:46:27.890
3 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:google:gemini-cli:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:google:gemini-cli:0.40.0:preview2:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:google:run-gemini-cli:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 24 Jun 2026 14:17:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Jul 2026 19:46:27 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 05:17:25 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · f45cbf4e-4146-4068-b7e1-655ffc2c548c · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Clear
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g
Published# Summary Gemini CLI (`@google/gemini-cli`) and the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions. # Details Folder Trust in Headless Mode In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environments (headless mode) automatically trusted workspace folders for the purpose of loading configuration and environment variables. This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted folders in headless mode (e.g. CI workflows that review user-submitted pull requests). If used with untrusted directory contents, this could lead to remote code execution via malicious environment variables in the local `.gemini/` directory. To ensure consistency and user control, the latest update aligns headless mode behavior with interactive mode, requiring folders to be explicitly trusted before configuration files (such as `.env`) are processed. As a result of this change, GitHub Actions and other automated pipelines that rely on the previous automatic trust behavior will fail to load workspace-specific settings until they are updated to use explicit trust mechanisms. Tool Allowlisting under \--yolo In previous versions, when Gemini CLI was configured to run in `--yolo` mode, it would ignore any fine grained tool allowlist in `~/.gemini/settings.json` (e.g. `run_shell_command(echo)` would allow any command). This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted inputs with `--yolo` (e.g. CI workflows that triage user-submitted GitHub issues where we recommend a strict allowlist). If used with untrusted content and a tool allowlist that permits `run_shell_command`, this could lead to remote code execution via prompt injection. In version `0.39.1`, the Gemini CLI policy engine now evaluates tool allowlisting under `--yolo` mode, which is useful for CI workflows that allowlist a few safe commands to run when processing untrusted inputs. As a result, some workflows that previously depended on this behavior may fail silently unless tool allowlists are modified to fit the task. # Impact This impact is limited to workflows using Gemini CLI in headless mode. Any use of Gemini CLI in headless mode without folder trust will require manual review to correctly configure folder trust. **This affects all Gemini CLI GitHub Actions.** Users must review their workflows, and take one of two approaches: 1\. If the workflow runs on trusted inputs (e.g. reviewing PRs from trusted collaborators), set `GEMINI_TRUST_WORKSPACE: 'true'` in your workflow. 2\. If the workflow runs on untrusted inputs, review our guidance in [google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli](https://github.com/google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli) to harden your workflow against malicious content, and set the environment variable. # Patches The folder trust and tool allowlisting mitigations are available in `@google/gemini-cli` version `0.39.1` and `0.40.0-preview.3`. By default, the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action will receive and run the latest version of `gemini-cli`. However, if your workflow specifies a version of `gemini-cli` by setting the [gemini\_cli\_version](https://github.com/google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli#user-content-__input_gemini_cli_version), you are encouraged to upgrade to one of the patched versions and audit the workflow settings that use Gemini CLI. # Credits Gemini thanks the following security researchers for reporting this issue through the Vulnerability Rewards Program (g.co/vulnz): * Elad Meged, Novee Security * Dan Lisichkin, Pillar Security research team
- Source published
- 24 Apr 2026 19:30:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Sep 2026 03:55:55 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · CRITICAL