GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9Published

Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-84321

Published

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, GenerateShortToken creates standalone short-token records without a long Token value, but DeleteUserTokens invalidates cached entries only when the long Token field is nonempty. A revoked short token can therefore remain in the short_token cache and authenticate again if the associated account is re-enabled before the cache entry expires because GetTokenUserByShortToken reads the surviving entry, restoring access to HTTP or WebSocket routes that accept short-token authentication. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.

Source published: 12 Oct 2026 20:49:36 UTC
Source modified: 13 Oct 2026 15:50:29 UTC
Observed here: 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms: CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 5.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-97864

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 12, 2026, 8:49:36 PM

dateUpdated: Oct 13, 2026, 3:50:29 PM

Source published: Oct 12, 2026, 8:49:36 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified: Oct 13, 2026, 3:50:29 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here: 7 Nov 2026 15:21:56 UTC
Source terms: ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-84321

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-613

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-12T21:17:22.817

lastModified: 2026-10-13T16:17:23.713

Source published: 12 Oct 2026 21:17:22 UTC
Source modified: 13 Oct 2026 16:17:23 UTC
Observed here: 25 Oct 2026 16:19:16 UTC
Source terms: NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9

Published

### Summary Standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket and explicit-token authentication can survive administrative revocation in cache. If the same account is later re-enabled before the cache entry expires, the deleted short token becomes valid again. ### Details `GenerateShortToken()` creates an `AuthToken` row that contains only `ShortToken` and no long `Token`. `DeleteUserTokens()` removes database rows, but when clearing caches it only invalidates entries where `authToken.Token != ""`. This leaves standalone short-token cache entries behind. `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` checks that cache first and then loads the user by ID, so the stale short token becomes usable again if the account status is restored to `true`. Relevant code paths: - [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:43) - [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:118) - [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:204) - [api/user/short_token.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/user/short_token.go:13) - [internal/middleware/middleware.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/middleware/middleware.go:82) ### PoC This was verfied locally in an isolated environment with a temporary package-level harness that exercised the real token issuance, revocation, cache, and re-authentication paths. What the executed test did: 1. Created an enabled user in a temporary SQLite database. 2. Called the real `GenerateShortToken(user.ID)` function to issue a standalone short token. 3. Verified that the token authenticated successfully and was present in the short-token cache. 4. Disabled the user and called the real `DeleteUserTokens(user.ID)` function. 5. Verified that the database token rows were removed. 6. Verified that the short-token cache entry still existed after `DeleteUserTokens`. 7. Re-enabled the same user. 8. Reused the previously deleted short token via the real `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` path and observed successful authentication. Observed result from the actual local verification: - The database token rows were removed during revocation. - The short-token cache entry remained present. - Re-enabling the user restored successful authentication through the stale short token. ### Impact Any deployment using standalone short tokens is affected. If a short token is stolen, administrative disable/delete-token handling may not fully revoke it. Re-enabling the account within the cache lifetime restores access for the stale token to any HTTP or WebSocket routes that accept short-token authentication.

Source published: 15 Oct 2026 20:14:01 UTC
Source modified: 19 Oct 2026 21:41:20 UTC
Observed here: 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms: GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6801

Published

Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Source published: 19 Oct 2026 21:08:35 UTC
Source modified: 19 Oct 2026 21:31:53 UTC
Observed here: 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms: OSV · upstream source license applies

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.