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Mojic: Observable Timing Discrepancy in HMAC Verification

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-wqq3-wfmp-v85g

Published

### Summary The `CipherEngine` in Mojic v2.1.3 uses a standard equality operator (`!==`) to verify the HMAC-SHA256 integrity seal during the decryption phase. This creates an Observable Timing Discrepancy (CWE-208), allowing a potential attacker to bypass the file integrity check via a timing attack. ### Details In `lib/CipherEngine.js`, the footer check validates the HMAC signature using a standard string comparison: `if (footerHex !== calcDigest) { ... }` Standard string comparisons in JavaScript short-circuit; they return `false` the moment a character mismatch occurs. Because the time taken to evaluate the comparison is proportional to the number of matching leading bytes, an attacker can measure the exact microseconds it takes for the engine to throw the `FILE_TAMPERED` error. By repeatedly altering the signature byte-by-byte and analyzing these minute timing differences, a malicious actor can theoretically forge a valid HMAC signature without possessing the decryption password. ### PoC The vulnerable implementation is located in `lib/CipherEngine.js`, within the `getDecryptStream()` flush method (approximately line 265): ```javascript // Vulnerable Code if (footerHex !== calcDigest) { this.emit('error', new Error("FILE_TAMPERED")); return; } ``` ### Recommended Remediation: Replace the standard equality operator with Node.js's built-in constant-time comparison utility, crypto.timingSafeEqual(). ```JavaScript // Remediated Code const footerBuffer = Buffer.from(footerHex, 'hex'); const calcBuffer = Buffer.from(calcDigest, 'hex'); if (footerBuffer.length !== calcBuffer.length || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(footerBuffer, calcBuffer)) { this.emit('error', new Error("FILE_TAMPERED")); return; } ``` ### Impact If successfully exploited, an attacker could tamper with the encrypted .mojic payload and forge a valid HMAC signature. This bypasses the integrity seal, tricking the decryption engine into processing maliciously injected emoji streams. Because the engine translates these emojis back into C keywords and raw data chunks, this could ultimately result in arbitrary Code Injection into the restored .c source code when an unsuspecting user decrypts the tampered file.

Source published
16 Apr 2026 21:10:17 UTC
Source modified
5 May 2026 16:26:32 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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Sources read 30 Oct 01:01 UTC · 272 of 272 readable · 271 fully read · documentation 468/469 current