Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-wv8c-6mx2-xf4j

Published

## Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - **Privileges Required:** Low: the role `Reader` is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - **User Interaction:** Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. - **Scope:** Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed. - **Integrity Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. - **Availability Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. ## Impact - Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters). - With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including `system:masters`, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).

Source published
5 Jun 2026 15:26:24 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 23:11:14 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 18 Nov 10:56 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 260 fully read · 11 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current