OpenClaw: Active Memory write scope could mutate global config

### Summary Active Memory write scope could mutate global config. In affected versions, a Gateway caller with `operator.write` access to the affected command could change global configuration without requiring `operator.admin`. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could apply configuration changes beyond the intended write scope. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.6`. ### Mitigations limit Active Memory write access to trusted operators until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Source published

18 Jun 2026 20:15:20 UTC

Source modified

18 Jun 2026 20:41:28 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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