Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
Published## Summary When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges. ## Details When handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container. The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities. ## Impact Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary. ### Conditions for exploitation - A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary. - The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content. ### Not affected Standard `docker cp` usage is **not** affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default: ``` docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt ``` This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to `docker cp` or the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API, for example: ``` cat archive.tar.xz | docker cp - mycontainer:/dir ``` Decompression formats using pure Go implementations (bzip2, zstd, and gzip when the container image does not contain an `unpigz` binary) are also not affected. ## Workarounds - Only run containers from trusted images. - Use authorization plugins to limit access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint. - Avoid piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images.
- Source published
- 18 May 2026 17:47:23 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:47 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH