SQLx Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing Casts
Exploitation and risk
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osv · GHSA-xmrp-424f-vfpx
PublishedThe following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord: > SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level > <http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf> > (Archive link for posterity.) Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data. It appears SQLx _does_ perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: <https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163> This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions `<= 0.8.0` are affected. ## Mitigation As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could _encode_ to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound. [`Encode::size_hint()`](https://docs.rs/sqlx/latest/sqlx/trait.Encode.html#method.size_hint) can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the `Json<T>` and `Text<T>` adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return `size_of::<T>()` instead. For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default. ## Resolution Work has started on a branch to add `#[deny]` directives for the following Clippy lints: * [`cast_possible_truncation`](https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/#/cast_possible_truncation) * [`cast_possible_wrap`](https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/#/cast_possible_wrap) * [`cast_sign_loss`](https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/#/cast_sign_loss) and to manually audit the code that they flag. A fix is expected to be included in the `0.8.1` release (still WIP as of writing).
- Source published
- 19 Aug 2024 16:02:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:18 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0363
PublishedThe following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord: > SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level > <http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf> > (Archive link for posterity.) Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data. It appears SQLx _does_ perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: <https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163> This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions `<= 0.8.0` are affected. ## Mitigation As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could _encode_ to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound. [`Encode::size_hint()`](https://docs.rs/sqlx/latest/sqlx/trait.Encode.html#method.size_hint) can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the `Json<T>` and `Text<T>` adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return `size_of::<T>()` instead. For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default. ## Resolution `sqlx 0.8.1` has been released with the fix: <https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23> Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: <https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901> MySQL and SQLite do not _appear_ to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.
- Source published
- 15 Aug 2024 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 Oct 2025 06:29:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.