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lobe-chat has an Open Redirect

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-xph5-278p-26qx

Published

### **Description** --- > Vulnerability Overview > The project's OIDC redirect handling logic constructs the host and protocol of the final redirect URL based on the X-Forwarded-Host or Host headers and the X-Forwarded-Proto value. In deployments where a reverse proxy forwards client-supplied X-Forwarded-* headers to the origin as-is, or where the origin trusts them without validation, an attacker can inject an arbitrary host and trigger an open redirect that sends users to a malicious domain. > Vulnerable Code Analysis > ```bash const internalRedirectUrlString = await oidcService.getInteractionResult(uid, result); log('OIDC Provider internal redirect URL string: %s', internalRedirectUrlString); let finalRedirectUrl; try { finalRedirectUrl = correctOIDCUrl(request, new URL(internalRedirectUrlString)); } catch { finalRedirectUrl = new URL(internalRedirectUrlString); log('Warning: Could not parse redirect URL, using as-is: %s', internalRedirectUrlString); } return NextResponse.redirect(finalRedirectUrl, { headers: request.headers, status: 303, }); ``` https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/aa841a3879c30142720485182ad62aa0dbd74edc/src/app/(backend)/oidc/consent/route.ts#L113-L127 ### PoC --- > curl Example > ```bash curl -i 'http://localhost:3210/oidc/callback/desktop?code=abc&state=test123' \ -H 'X-Forwarded-Host: google.com' \ -H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: https' ``` <img width="1504" height="304" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b71d937d-7be2-49db-8f3d-e07371912800" /> ### Impact --- - It can force users to redirect to untrusted external domains, leading to subsequent attacks such as phishing, credential harvesting, and session fixation. - It can disrupt the OAuth/OIDC flow user experience by redirecting users to malicious domains disguised as legitimate pages (even though this path doesn't directly include tokens, it can be exploited for social engineering attacks through redirect chains). - The impact can be amplified when redirect chains are combined with other vulnerabilities such as CSP bypass or cache poisoning.

Source published
24 Sep 2025 21:34:10 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:29 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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Sources read 10 Nov 12:38 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current