Malicious code in dzyhaxz-baileys (npm)
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
osv · MAL-2026-17622
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (03631e9889407ee8976e020933fa6984bd173c9a5de6b7a89ba7a5629437e705) dzyhaxz-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that, on every WhatsApp `connection.open` event, silently calls `sock.newsletterFollow` for a hardcoded channel ID `120363411407993897@newsletter` with `autoFollowChannels` defaulting to true. The README explicitly states 'No hidden auto-follow: Channel operations (sock.newsletterFollow) are strictly explicit', directly contradicting the shipped behavior — any application built on this library causes its WhatsApp-authenticated users to follow the author's channel without consent. Separately, `package.json` aliases the Signal protocol crypto library to an author-owned package via a mutable dist-tag: `"libsignal": "npm:dzyhaxz-libsignal@latest"`, with no version pin. The aliased module provides the ECDH curve primitives used by `lib/Utils/crypto.js` for WhatsApp end-to-end key agreement, and `md5`/`hkdf` are additionally re-exported from the author-controlled `@rexxhayanasi/wangcap-id-bridge`. Each install resolves whatever bytes the publisher currently points `latest` at. The auto-follow uses the installer's WhatsApp identity for reach-padding (no credential theft, no RCE, no account takeover), and the aliased crypto dependency has not been observed to contain malicious bytes in this version — but the combination is a deceptive cover-story and a weaponizable supply-chain shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (08fd08c1026dee023b11946f939f5fb1c5763566c9577ccb99c2aa7a3c0c2684) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
- Source published
- 5 Oct 2026 15:41:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 29 Oct 2026 13:48:10 UTC
- Observed here
- 29 Oct 2026 14:12:32 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.