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SiYuan before v3.7.4 Authentication Bypass via Encrypted Notebooks

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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cve-program · CVE-2026-72789

Published

SiYuan before v3.7.4 fails to properly validate publish access for encrypted notebooks, treating them as publicly accessible by default. Anonymous readers can enumerate and retrieve fully decrypted document content from unlocked encrypted notebooks through the publish API without authentication or key material.

Source published
12 Aug 2026 19:07:38 UTC
Source modified
14 Aug 2026 22:00:32 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-57449

Published

SiYuan before v3.7.4 fails to properly validate publish access for encrypted notebooks, treating them as publicly accessible by default. Anonymous readers can enumerate and retrieve fully decrypted document content from unlocked encrypted notebooks through the publish API without authentication or key material.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 12, 2026, 7:07:38 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 10:00:32 PM

Source published
Aug 12, 2026, 7:07:38 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 14, 2026, 10:00:32 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 18:37:17 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-72789

Published

SiYuan before v3.7.4 fails to properly validate publish access for encrypted notebooks, treating them as publicly accessible by default. Anonymous readers can enumerate and retrieve fully decrypted document content from unlocked encrypted notebooks through the publish API without authentication or key material.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-862

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-12T20:17:50.270

lastModified: 2026-10-24T15:10:00.190

Source published
12 Aug 2026 20:17:50 UTC
Source modified
24 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:19:03 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-v684-q882-jgmq

Published

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72789](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72789). ### Summary `publishAccess.json` is an opt-out list. The publish gate returns *accessible* for anything not explicitly listed in it. Encrypted notebooks are never written into that file, because only the administrator-gated `setPublishAccess` writes it and no part of the encryption subsystem does. Consequently every encrypted notebook is publish-accessible as far as the gate is concerned. While an encrypted notebook is unlocked, an anonymous reader in publish mode can list it, enumerate its documents, and retrieve their fully decrypted content. No key material, no password, and no cracking is involved. The kernel decrypts the data and serves it because the authorization layer never asks whether the notebook is encrypted. This is reported as a defect in the gate rather than in any individual handler. Endpoints that were previously reviewed and found to apply the correct checks do apply them. The checks return true. ### Details **The gate defaults to accessible.** `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(box, path, ignore)` iterates the ignore list and returns false only on a match: ```go for _, item := range publishIgnore { if item.ID == box || strings.Contains(path, item.ID) { return false } } return true // unlisted means accessible ``` **Encrypted notebooks are never listed.** `publishAccess.json` is written only by `setPublishAccess` (`kernel/api/router.go:169`), which carries `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly`. Nothing in `crypto.go`, `encrypted_ops.go` or `notebook_crypto.go` writes to it. An administrator would have to manually add each encrypted notebook to the ignore list to protect it, and nothing in the product prompts or documents that. **Neither core gate rejects them.** On both `eef105683` and `v3.7.4-alpha.1`: ```go func checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(...) bool { return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) && (password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) } ``` For an encrypted notebook the first term is true because it is unlisted, and the second is true because encrypted notebooks carry no publish password. The conjunction returns true. `IsEncryptedBox` does not appear in `kernel/model/publish_access.go` at all on master. On the development branch it appears once, inside `parseAttributeViewForPublishAccess`, where it routes *into* encrypted boxes rather than excluding them. The publish authorization layer has no concept of an encrypted notebook. **The chain.** Verified on the development branch, which is the harder target because the block-metadata, attribute-view, path-resolution and encrypted-notebook-status fixes have all landed there. 1. `lsNotebooks` calls `ListNotebooks()`, which includes encrypted notebooks and reports `Encrypted: boxConf.Encrypted` without filtering on it. The reader filter skips only notebooks that are `Closed` or publish-invisible. An unlocked encrypted notebook is neither, so it is returned to an anonymous reader together with its identifier. 2. `listDocsByPath{notebook: <encrypted box id>, path: "/"}` applies only `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore`, which passes, returning the document identifiers and titles inside the encrypted notebook. 3. `getDoc` routes to `GetDocInBox(...)`, after which `FilterContentByPublishAccess(...)` returns the content unmodified because the box is unlisted. The response is the fully decrypted document. `getBlockKramdown` reaches `GetBlockKramdownInBox` for the same result in Markdown. Handlers reach the decrypted store through `encryptedNotebookFromArg(arg)` on a client-supplied notebook argument. This function predates the current release and is not a recent addition. **The precondition is the unlock window.** `GetBlockTreeInBox` returns nil while a notebook is locked, treating it as nonexistent, and non-nil once unlocked. So the exposure is bounded to the period during which the legitimate user has the notebook open, which is precisely the period in which they are working in it. No action by the attacker triggers or extends that window, but no unusual condition is required either. **On endpoints previously assessed as correctly gated.** `getBlockDOM` and `getBlockKramdown` apply password and visibility checks. `exportPreview` applies `FilterContentByPublishAccess`. Those assessments are accurate and this report does not contradict them. The checks execute and return true, because the visibility term resolves to accessible for an unlisted box and the password term is vacuous for a notebook that has no publish password. Patching any individual handler would not change that result. ### Proof of Concept Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. An encrypted notebook that is currently unlocked by the legitimate user. Step 1, obtain the encrypted notebook's identifier: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/notebook/lsNotebooks {} → 200. The list includes the encrypted notebook, with encrypted: true and its id. ``` Step 2, enumerate its documents: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/listDocsByPath {"notebook":"<encrypted box id>","path":"/"} → 200, document identifiers and titles from inside the encrypted notebook ``` Step 3, retrieve decrypted content: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getDoc {"id":"<document id from step 2>"} → 200, the fully decrypted document ``` `getBlockKramdown` returns the same content as decrypted Markdown. Repeating step 3 while the notebook is locked returns not-found, which confirms the unlock window is the only thing standing between an anonymous reader and the plaintext. ### Impact The confidentiality guarantee of the encrypted-notebook feature is defeated against a remote, unauthenticated attacker for as long as the notebook is unlocked. A user who encrypts a notebook is expressing that its contents should be protected beyond the ordinary publish boundary. The publish gate does not recognise that intent, and instead treats the notebook as publicly readable because nobody added it to an opt-out list that the encryption feature does not write to. The exposure is full document content rather than metadata, and it applies to every document in the notebook. It requires no key material, no password, no offline work and no interaction with the encryption subsystem at all. ### Suggested fix Fail closed on encryption, independently of `publishAccess.json`: ```go if IsEncryptedBox(bt.BoxID) { return false } ``` in both `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` and `CheckBlockTreeMetadataAccessableByPublishAccess`, and exclude encrypted notebooks from `lsNotebooks` and `listDocsByPath` for read-only roles. The broader point is the default. An opt-out authorization list means every future notebook type, storage backend or content class is publicly accessible until somebody remembers to add it. Encrypted notebooks are the case where that default is most clearly wrong, but they are unlikely to be the only one.

Source published
8 Sep 2026 17:56:07 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:26:01 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GHSA-xx34-6cjg-prh8

Withdrawn

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-v684-q882-jgmq. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description SiYuan before v3.7.4 fails to properly validate publish access for encrypted notebooks, treating them as publicly accessible by default. Anonymous readers can enumerate and retrieve fully decrypted document content from unlocked encrypted notebooks through the publish API without authentication or key material.

Source published
12 Aug 2026 21:31:41 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 18:00:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2026-6434

Published

SiYuan: The publish-access gate treats encrypted notebooks as publicly accessible by default, allowing anonymous readers to retrieve fully decrypted document content while a notebook is unlocked in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Source published
10 Sep 2026 14:48:42 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:15:15 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:42 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current