Denial of service via unbounded map allocations in github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 and github.com/hamba/avro/v2
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GO-2026-5048
PublishedThe Avro map decoder accepts attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grows the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. A producer can declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fires. The fix introduces Config.MaxMapAllocSize with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. The new limit is opt-in: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. Upgrading to v2.33.0 alone does not mitigate the issue; consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set MaxMapAllocSize on their avro.Config.
- Source published
- 27 Jul 2026 16:16:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 03:41:56 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
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