Note Mark has Broken Access Control on Asset Download

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the asset download endpoint at /api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID} is registered without authentication middleware, and the backend query does not verify ownership or book visibility. An unauthenticated user who knows a valid note ID and asset ID can retrieve the full contents of private note assets without authentication, regardless of whether the associated book is public or private. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Source published

16 Apr 2026 23:56:02 UTC

Source modified

17 Apr 2026 18:40:45 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the asset download endpoint at /api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID} is registered without authentication middleware, and the backend query does not verify ownership or book visibility. An unauthenticated user who knows a valid note ID and asset ID can retrieve the full contents of private note assets without authentication, regardless of whether the associated book is public or private. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Source published

Apr 16, 2026, 11:56:02 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Apr 17, 2026, 6:40:45 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

1 Nov 2026 06:16:06 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the asset download endpoint at /api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID} is registered without authentication middleware, and the backend query does not verify ownership or book visibility. An unauthenticated user who knows a valid note ID and asset ID can retrieve the full contents of private note assets without authentication, regardless of whether the associated book is public or private. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Source published

17 Apr 2026 01:17:40 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 22:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 10:09:56 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

### Summary A broken access control vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to retrieve note assets directly from the asset download endpoint when they know both the note UUID and asset UUID. This exposes the full contents of private note assets without authentication, even when the associated book is not public. ### Details The issue is caused by the asset download route being registered without authentication middleware. Relevant route registration: - `handlers/assets.go`, line 40 ```go huma.Get(api, "/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}", h.GetNoteAssetContentByID) ``` By contrast, other asset operations correctly apply authentication middleware. For example: ```go huma.Delete(api, "/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}", h.DeleteNoteAsset, huma.WithMiddleware(h.authMiddleware.AuthRequiredMiddleware)) ``` The backend service for asset retrieval also does not enforce ownership or visibility checks. According to the provided code references, the lookup only queries the asset table by asset ID and note ID: ```sql SELECT * FROM note_assets WHERE id = ? AND note_id = ? ``` Because the retrieval path does not join against the related `notes` or `books` records, it does not verify: - whether the requester owns the parent book - whether the parent book is public or private - whether the related note has been deleted As a result, possession of a valid `noteID` and `assetID` is sufficient to retrieve the asset binary, regardless of whether the note belongs to a private book. The exploitability is constrained by identifier knowledge. Both `noteID` and `assetID` are UUIDv4 values, so blind guessing is impractical. However, the endpoint remains vulnerable whenever those identifiers are disclosed through another channel, such as leaked links, browser history, proxy logs, shared URLs, or other application behaviors that expose internal asset references. ### PoC The issue can be reproduced by creating a private note with an attached asset, then requesting the asset download endpoint without authentication using the valid `noteID` and `assetID`. The server returns the asset content even though the associated note is private. ### Impact - **Type:** Broken access control / unauthenticated information disclosure - **Who is impacted:** Any deployment exposing the affected asset download endpoint - **Security impact:** Full binary contents of private note assets can be disclosed to unauthenticated users who know the required identifiers - **Attack preconditions:** The attacker must know both the target `noteID` and `assetID`; no authentication is required - **Attack complexity:** High, because successful exploitation depends on prior disclosure of both UUIDs rather than feasible online guessing

Source published

13 Apr 2026 19:31:57 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:11:45 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

Note Mark has Broken Access Control on Asset Download in github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend

Source published

25 Jun 2026 22:34:34 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:01:21 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.