Terragrunt catalog predictable temp symlink clobber

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Terragrunt is a flexible orchestration tool that allows Infrastructure as Code written in OpenTofu or Terraform to scale. Prior to 1.1.1, the terragrunt catalog command derives a predictable per-repository catalog clone root under the shared system temporary directory and follows a symlink already placed at that path. A local attacker who can write to the temporary directory and predict the cataloged repository can redirect cleanup and cloning outside the intended root, causing an existing repository-named directory to be deleted and replaced in the victim's security context. The attack requires the victim to run terragrunt catalog on a shared host while the symlink is present, and it is not remotely exploitable. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.

Source published

3 Nov 2026 20:44:04 UTC

Source modified

7 Nov 2026 03:32:17 UTC

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 05:26:54 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 4.0 · 4.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Terragrunt is a flexible orchestration tool that allows Infrastructure as Code written in OpenTofu or Terraform to scale. Prior to 1.1.1, the terragrunt catalog command derives a predictable per-repository catalog clone root under the shared system temporary directory and follows a symlink already placed at that path. A local attacker who can write to the temporary directory and predict the cataloged repository can redirect cleanup and cloning outside the intended root, causing an existing repository-named directory to be deleted and replaced in the victim's security context. The attack requires the victim to run terragrunt catalog on a shared host while the symlink is present, and it is not remotely exploitable. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.

Source published

Nov 3, 2026, 8:44:04 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Nov 7, 2026, 3:32:17 AM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 13:31:10 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 4.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Terragrunt is a flexible orchestration tool that allows Infrastructure as Code written in OpenTofu or Terraform to scale. Prior to 1.1.1, the terragrunt catalog command derives a predictable per-repository catalog clone root under the shared system temporary directory and follows a symlink already placed at that path. A local attacker who can write to the temporary directory and predict the cataloged repository can redirect cleanup and cloning outside the intended root, causing an existing repository-named directory to be deleted and replaced in the victim's security context. The attack requires the victim to run terragrunt catalog on a shared host while the symlink is present, and it is not remotely exploitable. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.

Source published

3 Nov 2026 21:17:42 UTC

Source modified

3 Nov 2026 21:17:42 UTC

Observed here

4 Nov 2026 19:04:15 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

### Summary Terragrunt's `terragrunt catalog` command clones each repository referenced in your catalog configuration into a temporary working directory. In affected versions, the clone path it derived was deterministic and sat under the shared system temporary directory, in the form `<tmp>/catalog-<base64 sha1 of the repo URL>`. Because that path was predictable and Terragrunt followed a symlink already present there instead of rejecting it, a local attacker could plant a symlink at that path and cause Terragrunt to delete a directory and re-clone into it outside the intended temporary root. ### Impact This affected users who ran `terragrunt catalog` on a host they shared with other local users or processes they did not fully trust, such as a multi-user server or a shared CI runner. The attack required a local attacker: a separate local user or process able to write to the shared system temporary directory. It was not remotely exploitable, and the victim had to run `terragrunt catalog` while the attacker's symlink was already in place. Because the predictable path depended only on the repository URL being cataloged and the location of the system temporary directory, the attacker could compute it in advance and plant a symlink there before the victim ran the command. When the victim ran `terragrunt catalog`, Terragrunt followed the symlink out of the intended temporary root, deleted an existing `<repoName>` directory under the attacker-chosen parent, and repopulated that path with the cloned repository contents. All of this happened in the security context of the user running Terragrunt. The attacker controlled the parent directory the symlink pointed to, but not the leaf name: the leaf was fixed to `<repoName>`, derived from the repository URL the victim cataloged. The primitive was deletion of an existing `<repoName>` directory outside the temporary root, followed by a re-clone into that same path. On a single-user machine with no hostile local processes, exposure was minimal. ### Affected Versions - Terragrunt `< v1.1.1` ### Patches This vulnerability has been resolved in Terragrunt version `v1.1.1`. All users are strongly advised to upgrade. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, ensure that you do not allow untrusted parties to control the values of `TMPDIR`, `TMP`, and `TEMP` in environments where you run `terragrunt catalog`. ### Technical Details When you run `terragrunt catalog`, the catalog service iterates over the repositories in your configuration and prepares a local clone of each one. In affected versions, for a given repository URL it built a clone path by hashing the URL and joining the result under the shared system temporary directory: ``` <tmp>/catalog-<base64 sha1 of the repo URL> ``` This path was fully determined by the repository URL and the location of the system temporary directory, so anyone else on the machine who knew which repository a victim would catalog could compute it in advance. The catalog service passed this path into its clone preparation step. As a result, an attacker who placed a symlink at `<tmp>/catalog-<hash>` pointing at a directory of their choosing caused both the removal and the re-clone to operate through that symlink. Both landed at `<attacker-chosen-parent>/<repoName>`, outside the intended temporary root. Terragrunt `v1.1.1` no longer derives a predictable clone path, so an attacker can no longer position a symlink at a location known in advance. ## Credit We would like to thank ([@br0x2](https://github.com/br0x2)) for discovering and responsibly disclosing this vulnerability.

Source published

15 Oct 2026 18:21:35 UTC

Source modified

19 Oct 2026 21:40:47 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

Terragrunt catalog predictable temp symlink clobber in github.com/gruntwork-io/terragrunt

Source published

19 Oct 2026 21:08:35 UTC

Source modified

19 Oct 2026 21:31:50 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.