Malicious code in @aicommander/agent (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-10708
Withdrawn--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9a0d4917f10db91a59e47821bfa2399801219a85da0a59b8596d85fd3931fc93) @aicommander/agent installs a remote-machine agent that opens an outbound WebSocket to the hardcoded relay https://aicommander.dev and executes shell commands received over that channel on the installer's host. The message handler dispatches received commands to child_process.spawn with shell:true, streaming stdout/stderr back to the relay. A session code shared with the remote operator authorizes arbitrary command execution as the agent's uid — root when installed as the documented systemd service. This is full-host remote code execution driven by a network-sourced party, regardless of the relay being a first-party vendor server; possession of the session code by any remote party equates to full control of the installer's machine.
- Source published
- 16 Jul 2026 18:48:49 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 Aug 2026 04:01:37 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.