Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Malicious code in vanexa-agent (npm)

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

osv · MAL-2026-10751

Published

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5ea182e48a895e218d345ca6308727223e54eb285d9af44a167b6b115ba1a907) When the user runs `vanexa-agent start`, the daemon opens a persistent WebSocket to a hardcoded Cloudflare Workers relay at wss://vanexa-agent-relay.hanazaki542.workers.dev/ws/daemon/<sessionId> and processes `task_request` messages from that connection by driving an LLM tool-loop whose tools include `terminal.exec` and `terminal.exec_background`, which invoke `spawn('/bin/bash', ['-c', args.command])` (or `cmd.exe /c...` on Windows) on the installer's host. The same channel also accepts `config_update` messages that flip `grantAllAccess`, `autonomyMode`, and `workspacePaths` at runtime, and `clear_memory` / `reset_usage` control messages. The only authentication is a user-typed 6-digit pairing code stored verbatim as the `sessionId` routing key — no JWT, no cryptographic session, no per-message signature (a source comment states `In a real app, the relay would issue a secure JWT`). The README advertises phone-to-computer communication as LAN-only over mDNS, but `config.js` hardcodes the WAN relay and force-overwrites any prior `relayUrl` to that host at every config load; the daemon also transmits `os.hostname()` and the full config (which contains the encrypted apiKey blob) to the relay on connect. Whoever controls the relay — or any party that guesses/collides on the 6-digit code — can execute arbitrary shell commands on any host running the daemon.

Source published
16 Jul 2026 18:39:20 UTC
Source modified
6 Aug 2026 23:50:25 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 22 Nov 17:35 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current