Malicious code in checkout-get-pos-documents-am (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-12565
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0df9be66ed22c321db8a9a0eace4736f23ed1f2d9b5cd0a28e8bbc38c7163098) On any require/import of checkout-get-pos-documents-am, index.js loads _compat.js, which selects a per-platform binary (linux_x64, linux_arm64, darwin, win32.exe), downloads it over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are assembled by joining string fragments (e.g. "oob-worker.c"+"f103-070.wor"+"kers.d"+"ev"), writes the bytes to /tmp or %TEMP% under a masqueraded name, chmods 0755, and detach-spawns it via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", path+" &"], {detached:true}).unref(). If HTTPS fetch fails, the code falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel, calling dns.resolveTxt against subdomains under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru and reassembling base64 chunks from TXT records into an executable payload. No hash or signature verification is performed and the fetched binary bears no relation to the package's stated "runtime support" purpose. A second dropper implementation with the same fetch → base64-decode → chmod 0755 → /bin/sh spawn shape is bundled as lib/telemetry.js under an "Analytics SDK" cover story. Hostname string-splitting, DNS-TXT payload transport, filename masquerade, and detached spawn are deliberate evasion techniques.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 14:12:20 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 14:35:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.