Malicious code in checkout-mobile-dolyame (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-12574
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5f0a93e79c0b0c4d21d02028e254a60f52887ede6f69b57a5b65f8af37ead0fd) Requiring checkout-mobile-dolyame loads _loader.js via index.js, which selects an OS/arch-specific binary and downloads it over HTTPS from obfuscated Cloudflare workers.dev mirrors (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) whose hostnames are reconstructed at runtime from split-string fragments joined with.join(''). A fallback delivery channel resolves DNS TXT records under c.<domain> and N.<domain> (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru) to reassemble a base64-encoded payload, evading URL/domain filtering. The downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under masqueraded names (.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod 0755, then spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<file> &' or cmd.exe /c start /b with stdio ignored. No hash or signature verification is performed. The name resembles legitimate Dolyame checkout tooling, but the package's only observable behavior on import is downloading and running arbitrary attacker-supplied code.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 14:11:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 14:35:30 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.