Malicious code in boxy-loader (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-13055
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bdf7f097e307514d03c7f01bcb81f3efaab713337c948068679c90fc9a2b220c) On require('boxy-loader'), index.js loads _adapter.js which executes setup() at module top level. setup() picks a platform-specific remote path, downloads an opaque executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (hostnames such as oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev are assembled at runtime by joining split string fragments), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start. If the HTTPS fetch fails, loadViaDns() falls back to resolveTxt('c.<domain>') to obtain a chunk count and then resolveTxt('<i>.<domain>') against *.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated TXT records, writes the resulting bytes to disk and executes them — a DNS-tunneled payload channel designed to survive HTTPS egress filtering. Both the CDN host list and the DNS discovery domains are constructed from split string fragments to hide destinations from string-matching scans. The fetched executable is not shipped in the tarball, is not pinned or hash-verified, and is unrelated to any documented package purpose; the staging filename decoys (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe) further conceal it.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 14:30:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 15:52:01 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.