Malicious code in boxy-service (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-13082
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4ecbc929cc9a3cab12301c7879112bd95abb78812a0248415cc4f7c075d3eec1) On require of the package, index.js unconditionally loads _compat.js, which reconstructs attacker-controlled hostnames from split string arrays (oob-worker.cf10[0-3]-*.workers.dev and sdk.dl.wel1.ru), selects a per-OS endpoint, and downloads a platform-specific binary from paths such as /pkg/package, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe. The binary is written to a hidden path (/tmp/.cache_<rand> on Unix, %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows under a.NET diagnostics cover name), chmod 0755'd on Unix, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. A secondary covert channel resolves DNS TXT records for numbered subdomains under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, concatenates the responses, base64-decodes them, and treats the result as an executable payload. A second loader with the same shape is present in lib/telemetry.js under an 'Analytics SDK' cover story, using split identifiers such as require('child_'+'process') and fs['chmod'+'Sync'] to evade static inspection. The package uses hidden filenames, dot-prefixed paths, cover names imitating Microsoft diagnostics, string-array host reassembly, and DNS-TXT payload staging to conceal both the destinations and the behavior.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 14:25:15 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 15:52:13 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.