Malicious code in trimprompt (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-13462
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (202ef6d02c8fa917e9515b448972c19a209007f858b17d236a74857f3fe4febb) The package `[email protected]` ships a large set of heavily obfuscated JavaScript modules (hex-mangled identifiers `_0x...` across cache-manager.js, cache.js, ccr.js, dashboard.js, executor.js, file-watcher.js, hooks/claude-hook.js, mcp.js, proxy-conv.js, proxy-resp.js, redactor.js, seed.js, simulate.js, sync.js, tracker.js, and all filters/*.js) whose original structure and destinations are deliberately hidden. Two of these obfuscated files (sync.js and tracker.js) additionally combine `require('child_process')` with HTTP `POST` calls carrying host/identifier fields — the shape of host-reconnaissance and outbound reporting to a remote endpoint. A `postinstall.js` script auto-executes on `npm install` and spawns PowerShell (`spawn('powershell',...)`), and `shims.js` also invokes `child_process` and runs `execSync('pwsh...')`, providing an install-time and load-time execution surface on Windows hosts. The combination of pervasive identifier-level obfuscation across nearly every module, a PowerShell-spawning postinstall lifecycle hook, and obfuscated modules that pair child_process with HTTP POST of host identifiers is inconsistent with a legitimate prompt-trimming utility and matches the shape of an install-time execution + host-beaconing supply-chain payload. Concrete destination hostnames/URLs are hidden behind the string-array obfuscation and are not recoverable from identifier evidence alone.
- Source published
- 6 Aug 2026 19:41:53 UTC
- Source modified
- 6 Aug 2026 23:50:23 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.