Malicious code in @opezneppelin/contracts (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-13940
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (abe04ec28ed56cb0a253131129df8078d425f8a0c579c439ced9c75b6977a6ab) @opezneppelin/contracts is a typosquat of @openzeppelin/contracts. Its postinstall lifecycle script (scripts/postinstall.js) hex-escapes all module names, method names, and string constants (fs, https, child_process, powershell, -NoP,.exe) and stores the download URL as a base64 literal that decodes to https://files.catbox.moe/9bppy2.zip. On Windows installers, the script downloads that ZIP to %TEMP%, expands it via PowerShell Expand-Archive, recursively searches the extracted contents for the first.exe, and spawns it detached. The destination is an anonymous, mutable file-host (catbox.moe) unrelated to any OpenZeppelin infrastructure, and the fetched executable is opaque attacker-controlled content. The behavior fires automatically on npm install without any user action, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the installer's Windows host.
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 17:17:31 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Aug 2026 17:30:11 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.