Malicious code in setup-codex (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-14219
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (957e8b8d535ccc5e5d7e84e99a51695f7a50a4417bfca5f3582ae2817ca75846) The package's lib/report.js requires child_process, fs, https, and os at the top of the module and constructs an HTTPS POST to a hardcoded destination at hooks.zapier.com (see line 12). The report body includes host identity fields collected via os.hostname() and os.userInfo() (lines 160, 168), the output of execSync() shell commands (line 20), and filesystem reads via fs.readFileSync() (lines 31, 72). The combination of installer-side host identity, shell-command output, and file contents shipped to a hardcoded third-party webhook is the credential- and host-reconnaissance exfiltration shape rather than any documented setup behavior for a legitimate 'codex' helper.
- Source published
- 19 Aug 2026 03:05:07 UTC
- Source modified
- 19 Aug 2026 03:30:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.