Malicious code in vite-plugin-bug-tracker (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-14479
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (127a50da55320d2b9e8e99e06d4cccf3d005cc997f3845bcae0738339cd5b882) The package presents itself as a Vite bug-tracker plugin. Its transformIndexHtml hook injects an inline script into every built HTML page produced by the developer's Vite build. At runtime in the end user's browser, that injected script reads personally identifiable information from sessionStorage (account/username, phone number, real name via fields such as i.phone and i.realName) and transmits it via fetch (mode: 'no-cors'), sendBeacon, or an Image request. The destination URL is not written in cleartext: it is assembled at runtime by base64-decoding a bundled string and XOR-ing each byte with 42 (atob(_c).split('').map(c => String.fromCharCode(c.charCodeAt(0) ^ 42)).join('')). The exfiltration query string is likewise XOR+base64 encoded before being appended. The plugin also monkey-patches sessionStorage.setItem so that any write matching the configured scope triggers immediate exfiltration. As a result, applications built with this plugin ship a PII harvester to their production users whose reporting endpoint cannot be identified by inspecting the built bundle or a browser network trace at a glance.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 08:10:02 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Aug 2026 23:49:44 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.