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Malicious code in @user-services/web-components (npm)

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · MAL-2026-16379

Published

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (02523ee1cb3bbb9119054ec3ed14ffc62d0d33ae3bd44dc29312c772cdba106b) @user-services/[email protected] fires a hidden telemetry probe on both the npm install lifecycle (`node index.js`) and on every `require()` of the module. The probe in probe/impl.js reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname() and the basename of process.cwd(), concatenates them with a prefix `uswc` and a timestamp into a subdomain of `oob.algamil7x.xyz`, and issues a `dns.resolve4` query — the query name itself is the exfiltration channel, delivering installer identity to the attacker-controlled authoritative nameserver. The exfil pipeline is deliberately hidden from static analysis: supporting modules (b8d6e3.js, c9e7f4.js) reconstruct the strings `os`, `dns`, `process`, `userInfo`, `hostname`, `cwd`, `resolve4` and the destination host `oob.algamil7x.xyz` from `String.fromCharCode` byte arrays, and load the `os` and `dns` core modules via `module.constructor._load(...)` instead of a static `require`. The destination host is not the declared homepage and is not documented anywhere in the package. The scope `@user-services` and its placeholder repository/author metadata (`github.com/user-services/web-components`, `[email protected]`) are generic and consistent with a dependency-confusion lure aimed at organisations with an internal `@user-services/*` scope. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a26643867a117b96b0d18cd07cbec2dbc5968abf2ea90f77d2999de7806a4721) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published
22 Sep 2026 13:57:51 UTC
Source modified
12 Oct 2026 14:00:05 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

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Sources read 10 Nov 11:34 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current