Malicious code in pino-testkit (npm)

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f2711bf14b5de8acc2d8a401de585d09de28c4dc674331f6578acbc9ea36c6e7) [email protected] impersonates the widely-used `pino` logger: package.json declares the name `pino-testkit` with pino's description, lists Matteo Collina as author and the real pino maintainers as contributors, and the README is a mechanical copy of pino's README with `pino` rewritten to `pino-testkit`. The shipped source is largely a copy of pino with an extra file `lib/contract.js` wired in. `pino.js` exports `chain`, whose body calls `contract()`, so `require('pino-testkit')(...)` reaches the added file at load/call time. `lib/contract.js` uses a deterministic Fisher-Yates-style shuffle plus character substitution (`\x25`, `\x23\x30`, `\x23\x31`) to reconstruct the string `Function` and pluck `Function` off a captured global (`ype[OUN]`), then builds a new function from a second decoded body and immediately invokes it (`cMp(7746)`). Before doing so it hoists `require` and `module` onto `global`, so the dynamically constructed code can pull arbitrary further modules. Obfuscation of an executable payload combined with dynamic Function-constructor execution and require/module hoisting in a package that presents itself as `pino` is the canonical typosquat-dropper shape, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on any consumer that requires or uses this package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a263213f07071bf62a6f4fdb9c258b1e3cf70735f006d9dd6e7407e4107a42ff) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

23 Sep 2026 22:11:20 UTC

Source modified

9 Oct 2026 15:33:30 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.