Malicious code in vite-plugin-crypto (npm)
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
osv · MAL-2026-17222
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (54ee82c069dcdf259199f5844c6ff46be3020d79609ff7b7b8ebc82017c59b2c) [email protected] exposes a Vite plugin factory whose body concatenates three option fields — `secret`, `salt`, and `iv` — into a single string and passes it to `System.import(...)` from the `systemjs` runtime module loader, discarding the returned promise with `.then(() => {})`. Only `secret` is used by the advertised AES-GCM `encrypt()` path; `salt` and `iv` are declared on the options type but are absent from the documented options table and are unused by the real crypto code (which generates its own random salt/IV per call). The concatenated string is treated as a module specifier by SystemJS, which resolves URLs and executes fetched JavaScript, so whoever controls these option values obtains arbitrary JavaScript execution on the Vite build/dev host each time the config is loaded. Pulling in a browser-oriented dynamic module loader as the package's only runtime dependency, naming the concatenated input `derivedSecret`, and swallowing the promise frame the remote-loader call as a benign key-derivation step. Base64 decoding in dist/index.cjs and dist/index.js is used within the AES-GCM helper. The trigger fires at plugin construction during `vite build` / `vite dev`. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fdaf333e613f70df12ceaf378093d996a4bc1dd4df1a6350c4848a5de0fb83e7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
- Source published
- 28 Sep 2026 16:03:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Sep 2026 01:00:06 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.