Malicious code in noxleyss (npm)

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: noxleyss (npm), version(s): 1.1.11, 1.1.8, 1.1.7, 1.1.6, 1.1.5, 1.1.4, 1.1.3, 1.1.2, 1.1.1, 1.1.0, 1.0.0. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (426748d181f33679f7d387fd44147509b9a337b46d9249c7cf660ab5940b1287) noxleyss is a Baileys-family WhatsApp library fork that, on every successful WhatsApp connection ('connection.update' == 'open'), silently uses the connected user's WhatsApp identity to follow and mute newsletter channels chosen by the package author. Two mechanisms are present. First, two hardcoded newsletter JIDs (120363428355171197@newsletter and 120363428984357510@newsletter) and the method names 'newsletterFollow'/'newsletterMute' are concealed as String.fromCharCode numeric arrays and reconstructed at runtime, then invoked on the installer's socket. Second, in makeNewsletterSocket an 'autoJoinChannels' handler is wired to the connection-open event with a 30-second delay; it fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/noxXza/data/refs/heads/main/noxleys.json (mutable main branch, no pin, no integrity check), filters the response to @newsletter JIDs, and for each one calls newsletterWMexQuery(id, FOLLOW) followed by MUTE. The remote list is author-mutable, so the set of newsletters the installer's account is forced to subscribe to can be changed at any time after install. None of this is documented in the README. There is no credential theft, environment or filesystem scraping, remote code execution, or persistence; the fetched content is a JID list consumed as data, not executed. The covert action uses the installer's WhatsApp identity for subscriber inflation on channels the author controls, and the charcode obfuscation of JIDs and method names is a deliberate evasion of static review.

Source published

29 Oct 2026 13:33:09 UTC

Source modified

29 Oct 2026 13:48:10 UTC

Observed here

29 Oct 2026 14:12:32 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.