Malicious code in brioche-apl-dev-env (npm)
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
osv · MAL-2026-17432
Publishedbrioche-apl-dev-env is a dependency-confusion package: it takes a name that looks like an internal project, uses an inflated version (100.0.0) so it outranks private-registry versions, and runs `node setup.js || true` as a preinstall script on npm install. setup.js sends the hostname, username, working directory, OS, architecture, Node.js version and configured npm registry, with a per-package tracking token, in an HTTPS POST to `https://s85r5k14qk.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/prod/hook`. The npm account amel10 published brioche-apl-dev-env and 9 similar packages within two minutes on 2026-09-30, all with the same setup.js. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (637c99e6cd2bd8e143f01f5f522a7497375a24072fca131057cfd40ae0bb0d3e) The package declares a `preinstall` script that runs `setup.js` during `npm install`. That script collects installer host identifiers (hostname, OS username, current working directory, platform/arch, Node.js version, configured npm registry) together with a static per-package token, serializes them as JSON, and POSTs them to a hardcoded endpoint at https://s85r5k14qk.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/prod/hook. The package is presented as a small utility (vowel-counting) but its only install-time effect is this outbound beacon to an author-controlled AWS API Gateway URL. The version number (100.0.0) and package naming are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal `brioche-apl-*` namespace, and the transmitted fields (internal hostname, username, cwd, configured registry) are exactly the reconnaissance data used to identify successfully hijacked internal builds.
- Source published
- 30 Sep 2026 07:11:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Oct 2026 23:30:06 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.