Malicious code in focus-visible-polyfill-lite (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-17491
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5225b5a8636a589f9b90272ad04c3f4104670a23d5c24b45f6aeaa757a4f2a2b) The package is advertised as a focus-visible polyfill but ships thunderboltRegistry.js, which impersonates Wix thunderbolt internal registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, and others) via a Proxy-backed export stub. When the module is required, an IIFE at the top of the file uses child_process.execSync to run host reconnaissance commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, cat /etc/hosts) and sends the command output along with a beacon (Node version, platform, pid) via plain-HTTP GET requests to a hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoint at http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/ef9ea0e191006f3cc6670720c99c26f3. The package self-labels the beacon as 'rce-poc'. The shape is a dependency-confusion / typosquat payload: a benign-sounding public package shadows Wix-internal registry names so that a build pipeline resolving these names from the public registry executes the reconnaissance payload with the installer's privileges on module load.
- Source published
- 4 Oct 2026 23:12:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Oct 2026 23:30:06 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.